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This thesis investigates the apparent intensification in 
hyper-nationalist sentiments in Greece and elsewhere in the 
Balkans resulting in part from international recognition of 
the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) as an 
independent nation-state in 1993-1994. The thesis concludes 
that Balkan hyper-nationalism and irredentism come to the fore 
when external powers are no longer imposing a quasi-peace on 
the Balkans and when there is a threat to the delicate balance 
of power in the Macedonian region. Both conditions have 
emerged since the breakup of the former Soviet Union and of 
the former Yugoslavia in 1991. The only solution that might 
successfully deal with these conditions would be a U.S.-led 
international effort to deter aggression and to promote 
economic recovery and democratic reform in the Balkans; but it 
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The historic struggle for Balkan hegemony through 
acquisition of the strategic Macedonian region has resumed. 
The military weakness of the newly independent Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) offers temptations to 
its neighbors, while irredentism has been manifest in FYROM 
itself.  This phenomenon is leading to competitive or 
"hype^'-nationalism.1 The result is a "spiraling effect" of 
misperceptions and increased animosity in the Balkans. 
Indeed, irredentist claims by FYROM and its neighbors have 
renewed past fears and resentments that have not been 
observed in the region since the end of the Greek Civil War 
in 1949. 
This thesis .investigates the apparent intensification 
in hyper-nationalist sentiments resulting in part from the 
international recognition of FYROM as an independent nation- 
state since 1993-1994, and the potential sparks that it may 
deliver to an already volatile Balkan crisis.  It appears 
that irredentist competition has been a persistent factor in 
the troubled relations between Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria, 
Stephen Van Evera defines hyper-nationalism as the 
glorification of one's national character, history, symbols, 
religion, etc., and of the rightness and legitimacy of one's 
cause, while maligning the claims of others.  For 
background, see Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: 
Europe After the cold War," International Security, Winter 
1990/91, pp. 23-24. 
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Albania, and Turkey; and this helps to explain the 
continuity of certain themes in their relations today 
concerning the Macedonian question.  Furthermore, it is 
generally agreed that the Macedonian region's location is of 
fundamental strategic value in controlling trade routes, 
arable land, and military avenues of approach to the Aegean 
Sea.  It is widely believed in the Balkans that whoever 
controls this territory possesses a dominant strategic 
advantage. 
Balkan alliances have historically formed along 
cultural and religious lines, and these alliances have 
involved links with the emergence of Great Power spheres of 
influence in the region.  The potential for the conflict in 
the Balkans to escalate into a broader crisis—indeed, a 
larger war—is significant, partly because of the 
longstanding adversarial positions of Greece and Turkey and 
their roles in key European and transatlantic security 
institutions. 
The thesis concludes that Balkan hyper-nationalism and 
irredentism come to the fore when external powers are no 
longer imposing a quasi-peace on the Balkans and when there 
is a threat to the delicate balance of power in the 
Macedonian region.  Both conditions have emerged since the 
breakup of the former Soviet Union and of the former 
Xll 
Yugoslavia in 1991.  The only solution that might 
successfully deal with these conditions would be a U.S.-led 
international effort to deter aggression and to promote 
economic recovery and democratic reform in the Balkans; but 
it is far from clear that such an effort will be made. 
Myron Weiner's insightful model2, written in 1971, 
predicted what might well happen when external forces, such 
as those.engaged in the East-West power struggle of the Cold 
War, no longer dominated politics in the Balkans while local 
irredentist claims remained salient.  Only the determined 
leadership of a great power, such as the United States, 
might be able to counter these forces by imposing a new set 
of principles of conduct. 
Such leadership, according to Inis L. Claude, must 
possess the "resolution and audacity to move out front, to 
pull the majority along rather than to wait for it, to carry 
the lion's share of the burden while tolerating free riders, 
and to live with the inevitable criticism."3 The United 
States has proven itself capable of such leadership in the 
past.  If it deems this situation in the southern Balkans 
2Myron Weiner, "The Macedonian Syndrome: An Historical 
Model of International Relations and Political Development, 
World Politics, September 1971, pp. 665-683. 
3Inis L. Claude, "Collective Security After the Cold 
War," Third Annual Strategy Conference, Strategic Studies 
Institute, February 1992, p. 18. 
xiii 
important to its security interests, and its initial 
approach suggests that it does, then it is imperative that 
it find the political will to provide leadership regarding 
this explosive issue. 
xiv 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The upsurge of Balkan nationalism since the collapse of 
the Soviet empire has been reminiscent of the unstable 
situation caused by the collapse of the Ottoman empire 
during the 19th and early 20th centuries.  Nationalist 
movements are gaining support today across Eastern Europe, 
the former Soviet Union, and the Balkans. 
Loyalty (or enforced obedience) to the state is being 
supplanted by loyalty to an ethnic or national group that 
desires an independent state of its own, or that advocates 
territorial acquisitions at the expense of another 
independent state (irredentism).l    This phenomenon is 
leading to competitive or "hyper"-nationalism,2 which is 
causing a "spiraling effect" of misperceptions and increased 
animosity in the Balkans today. 
The historic struggle for Balkan hegemony through the 
acquisition of the strategic Macedonian region has been 
Stephen Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and 
War," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Spring 1994), 
p. 6. 
2Stephen Van Evera defines hyper-nationalism as the 
glorification of one's national character, history, symbols, 
religion, etc., and of the rightness and legitimacy of one's 
cause, while maligning the claims of others.  For 
background, see Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: 
Europe After the cold War," International Security/ Winter 
1990/91, pp. 23-24. 
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revitalized by the tempting, weakened condition of the newly 
independent Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). 
Irredentist claims by FYROM and its neighbors have renewed 
past fears and resentments not observed in the region since 
the cessation of the Greek Civil War in 1949.  Some of the 
most obvious current examples of hyper-nationalism at work 
may be found in the Balkan region:  in the breakup of 
Yugoslavia; in the Macedonian question; and in the 
irredentist movement within southern Albania (known in 
Greece as northern Epirus).  The nations involved in nearly 
every dispute are Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria, Albania, and 
Turkey. 
This thesis investigates the apparent intensification 
in hyper-nationalist sentiments resulting from the 
international recognition of the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia (FYROM) as an independent nation-state since 1993- 
1994, and the potential sparks that it may deliver to an 
already volatile Balkan crisis. 
A crucial aspect of this study is an analysis of claims 
-- historical, cultural, and ethnic — to the Macedonia 
region and the perceived threat these claims present to the 
balance of power in the region.  The analysis deals with the 
following questions:  Why is the Macedonian region such a 
contested area?  What past experiences have contributed to 
the hatred and resentment in this volatile region?  To what 
extent has FYROM's decision for independence contributed to 
the rise in competitive nationalism in all of its neighbors? 
And what are the prospects for the nationalist and 
irredentist ambitions that have become evident—for 
instance, Greece's perception of FYROM's claims regarding 
the Greek Macedonian terrritory?  This thesis investigates 
the historical antecedents in the struggle for the 
Macedonian region in order to draw analogies for 
contemporary analytical purposes. 
A.  BACKGROUND AND APPROACH 
It appears that the competition to obtain lost 
territory through irredentism has been a persistent factor 
in the troubled relations between Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria, 
Albania, and Turkey and helps to explain the continuity of 
certain themes in their relations today concerning the 
Macedonian question.  Furthermore, it also appears that the 
Macedonian region's strategic location in southeastern 
Europe is fundamental in controlling trade routes, arable 
land, and military avenues of approach to the Aegean Sea. 
It is widely believed in the Balkans that whoever controls 
this territory possesses a dominant strategic advantage in 
the balance of power in the region.  Writing about the 
importance of this region, Barbara Jelavich says: 
The great significance of the area [the Macedonian 
region] was its strategic location.  It was the heart 
of the peninsula....For the Balkan nationalities, the 
issue was even more immediate and vital:  whoever held 
Macedonia would have the predominant strategic position 
in the peninsula.  The chief objection, it will be 
remembered, to the great Bulgaria of [the Treaty of] 
San Stefano [of 1878] had been that the boundaries 
assigned, incorporating Macedonia, would make the state 
the strongest in the Balkans.3 
This inquiry also analyzes the "spiraling effect" of 
Balkan hyper-nationalism in the struggle for the Macedonian 
region, and the plausibility of a wider Balkan conflict.  A 
crucial aspect of this study is an investigation of the 
formation of Balkan alliances (actual or potential) along 
cultural-religious lines, and how these alliances seem to 
involve links with the emergence of Great Power spheres of 
influence and power politics in the region. 
Perceptions and misperceptions play an important role 
in the escalation of competitive nationalism within the 
Macedonian region.  Misperceptions of foreign actions and 
intentions have developed throughout Balkan history owing 
to a "strategic culture"4 that is characterized by an 
3Barbara Jelavich, History of the Balkans: Twentieth 
Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 
89-90. 
4Ken Booth defines strategic culture as "a nations's 
traditions, values, attitudes, patterns of behaviour, 
habits, symbols, achievements and particular ways of 
adapting to the environment and solving problems with 
respect to the threat or use of force." Ken Booth, "The 
Concept of Strategic Culture Affirmed," in Strategic Power: 
USA/USSR, ed. Carl G. Jacobsen (London: Macmillan, 1990), p, 
"Eastern" (i.e., non-Western) identity.  This "Eastern" 
identity was formed as a result of the great schism between 
the Roman Catholic West and the Orthodox East in 1054 A.D., 
and the Ottoman Empire's influences during nearly 400 years 
of rule in the Balkans.  According to S. Victor Papacosma, 
For generations educated Europeans and Americans have 
been inspired by and have learned about the 
achievements of Greece's Classical period that spawned 
so much of what we recognize as Western civilization. 
But they have learned little about the exotic 1000-year 
Byzantine Empire and even less about the period of 
alien Ottoman Turkish domination, both of which 
affected Greek [and more generally, Balkan] culture. 
Because of these latter developments, the Greek world 
assumed more of an "eastern" identity that separated it 
from areas to its west in Europe.5 
Papacosma's analysis suggests that in the current 
escalation of tensions In the Balkans, decision-makers (and 
mass publics) may be perceiving the actions or intentions of 
their neighbors as more hostile than they actually are, or 
they may view the behaviour of their historic enemies as 
more purposeful, coordinated, and complex than it really 
is.6 Although this alone may not create the impetus for 
121. 
5S. Victor Papacosma, "Politics and Culture in Greece," 
Institute for Social Research (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Center for Political Studies, 1988), p. 3. 
5Fourteen hypotheses concerning misperceptions by 
decision-makers are described by Robert Jervis, "Hypotheses 
on Misperception," International Politics, ed. Robert J. Art 
and Robert Jervis (New York: HarperCollins, 1992), pp. 472- 
486. 
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conflict, it may be enough to blind political elites and 
prevent them from seeing that "the other side is reacting 
out of fear of the first side, which can lead to self- 
fulfilling prophecies and spirals of misperception and 
hostility."7 
Finally, this study compares the characteristic 
patterns of political development and international 
relations among the principal Balkan states involved in 
irredentist disputes, on the basis of the historical model 
suggested by Myron Weiner.8  The purpose is to seek a better 
understanding of the causes of conflict, and of the probable 
courses of action of the disputants.  Proposed solutions to 
the conflict are then critically evaluated in chapter 5. 
B.  SIGNIFICANCE 
The potential for the conflict in the Balkans to 
escalate into a broader crisis—indeed, a larger war--is 
significant, partly because of the longstanding adversarial 
positions of Greece and Turkey and their roles in key 
European security institutions. 
It appears that Balkan political elites are attempting 
to promote a deeper understanding in Western elite circles 
7Ibid., p. 484 
8Myron Weiner, "The Macedonian Syndrome: An Historical 
Model of International Relations and Political Development," 
World Politics, September 1971, pp. 665-683. 
of the  threats to national identity, cultural heritage, and 
national security that are perceived in Athens, Ankara and 
other capitals, in order to stimulate the major Western 
nations, especially those in the European Union and NATO, to 
address the factors that may lead to a wider Balkan 
conflict. 
Because the Balkans are currently a hotbed of 
uncertainty and potential explosiveness, the study of threat 
perceptions and consequent alliance-building in this region 
is timely and relevant.  This thesis may furnish a basis for 
generalizations about the origins and dynamics of hyper- 
nationalism and irredentism—problems of enduring concern in 
international security. 
C.  HYPOTHESIS 
It is hypothesized that the current diplomatic 
stalemate concerning the Macedonian question is exacerbating 
Balkan hyper-nationalist sentiments, quickening the pace of 
agrressive provocations, and encouraging the formation of 
alliances and alignments.  This process is leading Balkan 
states away from a peaceful settlement and could help cause 
an expanded war in the Balkans. 

II.  HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS IN THE STRUGGLE FOR MACEDONIA 
Three sets of factors help to explain the struggle for 
the Macedonian region:  the region's intrinsic ethnic, 
geographic, and strategic significance; nationalist 
uprisings during the 19th and early 20th centuries; and 
great power politics and aspirations in the Balkan region.9 
These factors remain pertinent today. 
Although this region experienced relative peace and 
stability under the yoke of communism from the mid-1940's 
until Yugoslavia collapsed in 1991, it is now witnessing a 
series of changes that threaten the status quo of national 
borders and that could bring further instability to the 
Balkans.  With the breakup of Yugoslavia, the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) declared its 
independent sovereignty on September 17, 1991, and applied 
for recognition from the United Nations. 
This decision created a series of predicaments and 
stirred up past hatreds and resentments in a region where 
people do not easily forgive and forget.  FYROM's 
independence brought to mind past grievances that were never 
fully reconciled, and (at least in the eyes of its 
9Dimitrije Djordjevic and Stephen Fischer-Galati, 
Balkan Revolutionary Tradition (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1981), p. 176. 
neighbors) threatened to upset the regional balance of 
power.  Prior to the collapse of the Soviet empire, 
Yugoslavia maintained a pro-Western (but nominally, non- 
aligned) policy in the region.  From 1949 (with the 
conclusion of the Greek civil war) to 1991 (the breakup of 
Yugoslavia), Greece was able to use a strategy of detente, 
at times, with Yugoslavia and Bulgaria to counterbalance 
against perceived Turkish military advantages or threats in 
the region.  Although Turkey and Greece were both NATO 
members after 1952, Greece still felt threatened by its 
eastern neighbor, and especially after the 1974 invasion of 
Cyprus.  As long as a status quo was accepted with no 
disputes over borders along its north, Greece would then be 
able to concentrate its energies along its eastern front 
with Turkey.10 
However, since the breakup of Yugoslavia, Balkan states 
must now contend with the possibility of FYROM allying with 
Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia, or Turkey.  This has 
created fear in many Balkan states—fear of "a negative tilt 
in the regional balance of power."11 The primary concern 
Balkan states have with FYROM is the strategic importance of 
10Nikolaos Zahariadis, "Nationalism and Small-State 
Foreign Policy: The Greek Response to the Macedonian Issue," 
Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 109, num. 4, 1994, pp. 
653-654. 
uIbid., p. 654. 
10 
the land it occupies. 
The Macedonian region is commonly regarded to have its 
northern border at the Sar Mountains in FYROM; its east 
bordered by the Rhodope Mountains in Bulgaria; its southern 
borders < along the Pindus range, Mt. Olympus, and the Aegean 
Sea in Greece; and its western borders along Lake Ohrid, 
which sk irts between FYROM and Albania.12 Within this total 
region, approximately 50% is located in the boundaries of 
Greece, 40% in FYROM, and 10% in Bulgaria. 
The Macedonian region's strategic location in 
southeastern Europe is fundamental.  It commands the heart 
of the peninsula and the routes through the mountain passes 
to the key ports of Thessoloniki and Kavala on the Aegean 
Sea.  As Elisabeth Barker points out, "Macedonia contains 
the main north-south route from central Europe to Salonica 
and the Aegean down the Morava and Vardar Valleys."13 
Therefore, whoever controls this territory possesses a 
dominant strategic advantage in the balance of power in the" 
region, and has the potential to either strengthen or lessen 
the dominant central European powers' influence in the 
12Jelavich, History of the Balkans: Twentieth Century, 
p. 89. 
"Elisabeth Barker, Macedonia: Its Place in Balkan 
Power Politics (London: Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, 1950), p. 17. 
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Mediterranean and the Middle East.14  That is why the region 
was coveted by not only the emerging Balkan states.  As 
Wilkinson points out, "the governments of the four great 
empires of Austria-Hungary, Russia, Turkey, and Great 
Britain were alike conscious of maintaining or acquiring, as 
the case might be, control of the whole or part of 
Macedonia, which they rightly regarded to be the key to the 
Near East."15 
Another way of viewing the geopolitical importance of 
this region is by comparing it with central Europe. 
Generally speaking, a strong power in central Europe has 
traditionally dominated the region and even at times 
threatened the security of its neighbors, but a weak power 
in central Europe has typically offered a great temptation 
to its neighbors for intervention and even appropriation. 
This pattern characterizes the situation in Macedonia and 
helps explain why it has been such a contested region. 
A. BALKAN NATIONALIST UPRISINGS 
Arguments given by Balkan states for Macedonian claims 
have been based on three principles: the "usable" past and 
14Symeon A. Giannakos, "The Macedonian Question 
Reexamined: Implications for Balkan Security," Mediterranean 
Quarterly, Summer 1992, p. 34. 
15H.R. Wilkinson, Maps and Politics: A Review of the 
Ethnographic Cartography of Macedonia (Liverpool: Liverpool 
University Press, 1951), pp. 4-5. 
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historical precedents; the ethnic composition or national 
consciousness of the people; and the importance of 
maintaining a balance of power.15 Usually, a competitive, 
hyper-nationalism17 is the resulting effect of the claims 
made by an irredentist power.  Hyper-nationalism has been 
the repetitive outcome in the struggle for control of the 
Macedonian region, and it is still prevalent today.  Boyd 
Shafer describes the phenomenon of hyper-nationalism in the 
context of "mythmaking" and "self-glorification" in European 
education during the late 19th and early 20th centuries: 
Text and teacher alike, with a. few notable exceptions, 
taught the student that his own country was high- 
minded, great, and glorious.  If his nation went to 
war, it was for defense, while the foe was the 
aggressor.  If his nation won its wars, that was 
because his countrymen were braver and God was on their 
side.  If his nation was defeated, that was due only to 
the enemy's overwhelmingly superior forces and 
treachery.  If his country lost territory, as the 
French lost Alsace-Lorraine in 1870, that was a crime; 
whatever it gained was for the good of humanity and but 
its rightful due.  The enemy was "harsh," "cruel," 
"backward." His own people "kind," "civilized," 
"progressive."18 
This type of self-glorification and mythmaking created 
the paradigm, in many cases, that emerging Balkan states in 
16Jelavich, History of the Balkans: Twentieth Century, 
p. 90. 
17See footnote 3, for Stephen Van Evera's definition of 
the term "hyper-nationalism." 
18Boyd Shafer, Nationalism: Myth and Reality (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace, 1955), p. 185, cited in Van Evera, "Primed 
for Peace," p. 23. 
13 
the 19th century used as a moral and legal basis to 
formulate foreign policy and pursue vital interests.  Hence, 
hyper-nationalism was and still is a main contributing 
factor in the persisting struggle for dominance among the 
Balkan states.  As a result of this distorted paradigm, 
Balkan states misperceived other states' actions or 
intentions, leading to a heightened state of tension in the 
competition for Macedonia. 
This competition was also triggered by the decaying 
condition of the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century.  For 
centuries, the Ottomans had dominated the territories and 
peoples of the Balkans with little interference from other 
Great Powers.  However, the situation began to change when 
expansive designs and the rise of pan-Slavism commenced 
within the Russian Empire and when the rise in ethnic 
nationalism caused concern and insecurity within the Austro- 
Hungarian Empire. 
Another factor that contributed to the competition in 
the Balkans stemmed from the conceptual writings of the 
Enlightenment.  Some of these writings, notably those by 
Rousseau, helped to encourage the strong political current 
of nationalism.  This notion of nationalism aimed for the 
sovereignty of the nation-state through the self- 
determination of its people.  No longer would the basis of 
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legitimacy and sovereignty be found in the king but instead 
in the people, and no longer would the people be mere 
subjects of the king but citizens of a sovereign nation- 
state. 
Nationalism, and the idea of a national identity, also 
raised the status of the masses to a level that only a 
privileged few and a tiny elite were once allowed to hold. 
With Rousseau's concept of the "general will," the mass 
public was seen as the source of political legitimacy.  The 
notion of nationalism dealt with the individual nation's 
importance and international status and position.19 Here 
the idea of nationality characterized itself in a common 
geographical area, a shared culture (language, ethnology, 
customs, traditions, history, religion, etc.,), and an 
awareness of a shared destiny or sense of mission. 
Nationalism also based itself on the idea of an individual 
identity found within a "people," which Liah Greenfeld 
describes as the "bearer of sovereignty, the central object 
of loyalty, and the basis of collective solidarity."20 
It was this "preoccupation with status" that motivated 
the inhabitants of this Balkan region to exchange their rank 
as occupied subjects for the rank of citizens in a 
19Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1992), pp. 487-488. 
20Ibid., p. 3. 
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sovereign state.  And it was precisely this striving and 
competition for sovereignty, within a crumbling Ottoman 
Empire, which brought Greece, Serbia, and Bulgaria on a 
collision course in Macedonia.  Evangelos Kofos says that 
the Macedonian question emerged during the Balkan 
nationalist movements of the 19th century because of the 
"hoped for withdrawal, or eviction of the. Ottomans from 
their European possessions.  The rush to fill the vacuum 
brought to the foreground the question of succession in 
Macedonia and Thrace, two regions of mixed ethnic 
composition. "21 
The common past in the Macedonian region is what all 
three emerging nation-states found attractive and useful. 
For Greece, the raising of the flag by the Bishop of Patras 
at the monastery of Agia Lavra on March 25, 1821, publicly 
symbolized the organized struggle for independence from the 
Ottomans, and placed Greece on the road toward a clash with 
its Slavic neighbors.  Several factors help to explain the 
emergence of the Greek revolt of the 1820*s.  The works of 
the Enlightenment writers, such as De 1'esprit des lois (The 
spirit of the Laws) by Montesquieu, were translated into the 
Greek language and distributed throughout Greece and the 
21Evangelos Kofos, Nationalism and Communism in 
Macedonia (New Rochelle, NY:  Aristide D. Caratzas, 1993), 
p. 291. 
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Balkan region as a forerunner to the Greek revolution.  In 
addition, the enlightened Rigas Velestinlis, influenced 
greatly by the French revolution, published 3,000 copies of 
his "revolutionary manifesto, a declaration of the rights of 
man, a constitution, and a martial hymn calling on the 
Balkan Christians to throw off their chains."22 
This ideology of "liberty, equality, and fraternity" 
had a strong appeal to the Greeks, who by now were pondering 
the notion of a nation-state based on the continuity of 
their language and ancestry dating back to the classical 
age.  They envisioned, as many Balkan people did during this 
era, a state based on their own culture and history. 
Specifically, the Greeks cited the multiracial empires of 
Alexander the Great and the Byzantines as relevant 
historical examples (key elements of the "usable" past) for 
establishing a new nation-state. 
The outcome of surveying their past was exhibited in 
the Graecia irredenta,   or the "Great Idea."  This aspiration 
imagined a Hellenic state covering those territories and 
regions populated by a Slavic and Turkish population. 
Consequently, the Greeks developed a concept of nationality, 
which did not emphasize ethnicity as a prerequisite for 
22Douglas Dakin, The Unification of Greece: 1770-1923 
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1972), p. 21. 
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citizenship.  Douglas Dakin describes this idea of 
nationality as "Mazzinian," in which the Greeks "stressed 
the elements of language, common history, and individual 
consciousness"23 as the basis of nationality.  Dakin later 
says that "anyone who thought and called himself a Greek 
was, in general estimation, a Hellene."24 
It was natural at the time that the Greeks would adopt 
a notion of nationality such as described above.  The 
classical era and civilization of ancient Greece had ended 
more than a thousand years earlier.  Departing with that era 
was the sense of race or ethnic homogeneity.  Waves of 
invading peoples descended into the Balkan peninsula. 
Goths, Huns, Avars, Slavs, Bulgars, and Magyars swept 
through and settled in the Balkans from the third to the 
seventh centuries.  The responsibility of dealing with 
these diverse races fell on -the Roman Empire, and in 
particular, the Eastern Roman Empire in Byzantium. 
During the remainder of the nineteenth century and the 
early twentieth century the Greeks attempted to pursue this 
"Great Idea" within the Balkan region.  However, 
simultaneously, Slavic nationalism was on the rise, and this 




of Macedonia and Thrace.  Like the Greeks, the Slavs also 
looked to their history and culture as sources for nation- 
building efforts.  And like the Greeks, both Serbia and 
Bulgaria coveted the regions of Macedonia and Thrace as a 
legacy of their past medieval empires. 
The first Bulgarian Empire reached its zenith in the 
9th and 10th centuries under the reign of Tsar Simeon (893- 
927).  Its boundaries stretched from the Black Sea in the 
east to the Adriatic Sea in the west, and from the Danube in 
the north to the Pindus Mountain range in the south. 
Earlier, in 865, Christianity had become the accepted 
religion through the disciples of the two Orthodox 
missionaries - Cyril and Methodius.  These two brothers 
introduced a Slavic script that later became the Cyrillic 
alphabet. 
Constantinople, the capital of the Byzantine Empire, 
was coveted by the Bulgarians, and later by the Serbs and 
the Muslims for the symbolism it held in both the political 
and religious realm.  The constant struggle for the conquest 
of Byzantium, along with internal conflicts and invasions by 
the Hungarians and Russians, exhausted the Bulgarians. 
Consequently, the Bulgarian Empire was reduced 
significantly in the 11th century to the southwest corner of 
its previous boundaries, and its capital moved from Preslav 
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in the northeast to Ohrid in the southwest (now located in 
present day FYROM).  After a weakening of the Byzantine 
Empire in the 12th and 13th centuries, the Bulgarians under 
the reign of John Asen II (1218-1241) regained the height of 
their past Empire and again became a Balkan power. 
However, this situation did not last for long.  For the 
Serbs, under the Nemanja dynasty, were on the rise; and they 
would dominate the Balkans for several centuries until the 
expansion of the Ottoman Turks.  The Serbian Empire reached 
its height under Stephen Dusan (1331-1355), with the 
territorial conquests of much of the second Bulgarian 
Empire.  Serbia's expansion took place in a southern 
direction, and thus hastened the movement of its capital to 
Skopje (the present day capital of FYROM).  The dominance of 
the Serbs as a Balkan power came to a close at the historic 
battle in Kosovo in 1389, where the combined forces of 
Serbs, Bosnians, and Albanians were defeated by the 
Ottomans. 
B.  CONTINUITY IN CLAIMS FOR THE ACQUISITION OF MACEDONIA 
The competition for dominance of these medieval empires 
and the overlap of their past territories help to explain 
the struggle for the Macedonian region in the late 19th and 
early 20th centuries.  Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia each had 
a historic "usable" past that included a specific territory 
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and culture as a basis for visionary aspirations to 
nationhood.  In addition, Myron Weiner says that other 
commonalities included the fact that:  all were former 
colonies of the Ottoman Empire; all became monarchies at 
their time of independence; all were economically 
underdeveloped; all were multi-ethnic; and all had to 
develop within the sphere of Great Power rivalries during 
the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire.25 
Ethnic claims played the most significant and 
controversial role in arguments regarding Macedonia.  All 
Balkan nations seeking to gain influence and strengthen 
their arguments for territorial claims used ethnic 
composition and affiliation in Macedonia as a means to gain 
legitimacy.  Since this was a period characterized by hyper- 
nationalism, a striking diversity of opinion—relating to 
misrepresentations of facts, ignorance about Balkan 
ethnography, and the unreliability of official censuses— 
emerged regarding the geographic distribution of the main 
ethnic groups in the Macedonian region.26 Concerning this 
practice, Wilkinson says: 
25Weiner, "The Macedonian Syndrome," p. 666. 
26For a summary of the causes of diverse opinion, and 
for a sense of the different views regarding ethnic 
distribution in the Macedonian region (figures 79-86), see 
Wilkinson, Maps and Politics, pp. 314-326. 
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The onus of establishing the affinities of its 
population fell upon parties interested in its 
strategic and economic possibilities rather than its 
people.  All powers, both great and small, 
imperialistic and nationalistic, discerned the 
importance of putting exactly that interpretation on 
the ethnography of Macedonia which might best extend 
their influence in the area and so prepare the way for 
the establishment of local hegemony, or Near Eastern 
ascendency, as the case might be.27 
Consequently, six Balkan nations neighbouring the 
Macedonian region made claims based on ethnic affinity, 
which was twice the amount of claims in any other region in 
the Balkans.  This dilemma created an extreme disequilibrium 
in the nation-to-state-ratio in the Macedonian region.28 
That is, the demand for states by nations far exceeded the 
bounds of political feasibility, thus creating a 
disequilibrium and fostering immediate causes for conflict. 
Besides these claims and the political currents of 
nationalism and idealism, another factor that caused unrest 
was the deteriorating economic and administrative condition 
of the Ottoman Empire.  According to Gordon Craig, 
Had Turkish administration been more efficient, the 
Christian subjects of those provinces would have had 
little to complain about...But the decline of the 
imperial system was accompanied by a cessation of even 
a pretense at  economic improvement, and this made the 
subject peoples restive, while increasing their 
opposition to the numerous discriminatory taxes they 
27Ibid., p. 6.- 
28Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism," p. 11 
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had to pay.29 
Orthodox merchants - usually ethnic Greek, Armenian, or 
Serb - made up the bulk of the Ottoman population engaged in 
international trade and commerce.30  From this vantage 
point, these sailors, shipowners, and commercial agents 
could travel abroad to the West and compare first hand the 
differences between the administrative, political, and 
economic systems in the Ottoman Empire and those of the rest 
of Europe.  What they found was a large disparity between 
their condition and that of Western Europe, especially after 
the French revolution. 
One major source of dissatisfaction for the influential 
merchant class was the network of corruption and inefficient 
infrastructure within the Ottoman Empire.  Describing the 
conditions during the early 19th century, Barbara Jelavich 
says that "the merchant suffered from the poor roads and the 
unimproved waterways, and the disorder and anarchy in the 
countryside made his business dangerous...most important, he 
was almost completely without protection abroad."31 This 
distressed economic condition, along with other factors, led 
29Gordon A. Craig, Europe since 1815 (New York: 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1974), p. 20. 
30Barbara Jelavich, History of the Balkans: Eighteenth 
and Nineteenth Centuries, Vol. I, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993), p. 179. 
31Ibid., p. 185. 
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the Balkan Orthodox peoples to revolt against the Ottoman 
system. 
The Ottoman system began its decline during the 18th 
century.  Success for the Empire rested on the strength and 
abilities of the sultan and the military.  After a string of 
extraordinary sultans, a rapid deterioration occurred 
because of a problem with succession.32  Since the sultan 
held absolute power in government, religious, and military 
matters, a decay in the competence and abilities of the 
sultan meant a deterioration in the Empire. 
Next to the sultan in importance was the military, 
which played a principled role in maintaining the royal 
authority of the ruler.33 Once the Empire ceased expanding, 
revenues diminished for the salaries of the standing armed 
forces and for  technological improvements in weaponry. 
This meant that the professional soldier was forced to enter 
other ventures to assure financial security.  It also 
adversely affected the available strength of the fighting 
force.  Jelavich says that "it has been estimated that of 
the 400,000 enrolled janissaries, only 20,000 could be 
called upon in event of war."34  This situation affected the 
32Ibid., p. 45. 
33Ibid., p. 43. 
34Peter F. Sugar and Donald W. Treadgold, eds., A 
History of East Central Europe (Seattle: University of 
24 
internal security and stability of the Ottoman Empire, and 
also had a bearing on Great Power aspirations. 
Russia emerged as the most powerful continental force 
after Napoleon's defeat in 1814.  The subsequent Congress of 
Vienna established a European system of order.  This system 
was based on a balance of power among the Great Powers - 
Great Britain, France, Prussia, Austria, and Russia.  This 
arrangement brought the longest period of peace Europe had 
known to this time.  One of the alliances included the three 
eastern powers - Russia, Prussia, and Austria - and was 
called the Holy Alliance. 
The Holy Alliance was a conservative coalition of 
monarchies that attempted to preserve the internal status 
quo against the revolutionary currents of liberalism and 
nationalism spreading throughout Europe.  But the alliance 
was also skillfully used by Prince von Metternich of Austria 
to contain the territorial aspirations of an expansionist 
and powerful Russia.35 Russia's involvement in the Balkans 
as a protector of the Orthodox Christian population was 
observed with great suspicion by Austria and Great Britain. 
Austria regarded the Balkans as part of its sphere of 
Washington Press, 1977), p. 193, cited in Jelavich, History 
of the Balkans, Vol I., p. 48. 
35Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 1994), pp. 83, 87. 
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influence and did not trust the Russians to be  satisfied 
with that region alone.  Great Britain, on the other hand, 
felt that Russian expansion into the Balkans would threaten 
its lines of communication to its colonies in the east. 
So when the Greeks were in need of assistance during 
their bloody revolution in 1821, Russia was held in check by 
Britain and Austria because "England interpreted the Tsar's 
desire to protect the Christian population of the collapsing 
Ottoman Empire as the first stage of Russia's attempt to 
conquer Egypt."35 The themes of balance and competition 
between the Great Powers would recur, centering on the 
Eastern Question.  The drama included nationalist movements 
seeking independence in the Balkans, Great Power rivalries, 
and a crumbling Ottoman Empire.  The combination of factors 
prevented an Orthodox Christian Russia from coming to the 
aid of a Balkan Orthodox Christian population under Ottoman 
rule.  The outcome was a long, bloody struggle in the 
independence movements for Greece, Serbia, and Bulgaria. 
C.  BALKAN HYPER-NATIONALISM 
Bulgarian nationalism and the struggle for Macedonia 
and Thrace attracted Russia's involvement.  Serbia and 
Bulgaria caught the attention of the popular Panslav 
movement in Russia.  After Russia's defeat in the Crimean 
36Ibid., p. 89. 
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War, a means to carry out Russian imperialist designs in the 
Balkan region was established.  These designs focused 
primarily on "pursuing the ancient Russian dream of gaining 
Constantinople and the Straits."37  However, Serbia, due in 
part to Great Power politics, was later considered within 
the Austrian sphere of influence, and was instructed by the 
Russian government to seek assistance from that Great 
Power.38 . 
Bulgaria, on the other hand, began its nationalist 
struggle for independence much later than Greece and Serbia. 
This was due in part to its close proximity to the 
centralized power base of the Ottoman capital.  Contrary to 
what might have been expected, the focus of the Bulgarian 
nationalist movement was not aimed at the Ottoman Turks, but 
at the Greeks and the Ecumenical Patriarchate in 
Constantinople.  Bulgarian nationalists took this approach 
in their struggle for independence and the acquisition of 
Macedonia because the Greeks and the Greek language were 
predominant in the one factor setting apart the Christian 
population from the Turks in Macedonia - the Orthodox 
37 Ibid., p. 93. 
38Barbara Jelavich, History of the Balkans: Eighteenth 
and Nineteenth Centuries, Vol. I (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1983), p. 359, and Evangelos Kofos, 
Nationalism and Communism in Macedonia (New Rochelle, NY: 
Aristide D. Caratzas, 1993), p. 16. 
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Church.  Church affiliation had a direct linkage to national 
consciousness, so that even ethnic Slavs considered 
themselves Greek.39 
Therefore, the Bulgarians demanded a national Church, 
and the Turks, recognizing the opportunity to divide the 
Balkan Christians and lessen the Greek influence, granted 
permission on February 28, 1870, to establish the Bulgarian 
Exarchate.  This brought the level of competition for 
Macedonia between Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia to a stage 
not known before in Balkan nationalist movements'.  From this 
point on, Bulgarian nationalism and Russian imperialist aims 
would clash with the nationalist aims of Greece and Serbia 
in the multi-ethnic region of Macedonia.  Russia had now 
found a "loyal Balkan protege who could be properly 
projected as heir to the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans and 
the Aegean."40 
The Eastern Crisis of 1875-1878, which included the 
Russian -Turkish War of 1877-1878 and the subsequent San 
Stefano treaty, almost caused the realization of Russian and 
Bulgarian aims in the Balkans.  The San Stefano treaty, 
negotiated by the Panslav Russian Ambassador Ignatiev, 
shifted the balance of power by the creation of a large, 
39Kofos, Nationalism and Communism, pp. 11-15, 
40Ibid., p. 15. 
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autonomous Bulgaria.  This treaty provided Bulgaria with 
most of Macedonia, Eastern Rumelia, and Bulgaria proper. 
This made Bulgaria the largest state in the Balkans, holding 
strategic invasion routes found in the Macedonian region, 
and key outlets to the Aegean Sea in Thrace. 
Fortunately for Greece and Serbia, Great Britain and 
Austria would not allow the establishment of a Russian 
satellite in the Balkans that would possibly hinder Austrian 
expansion southward and British trade eastward.  London and 
Vienna rejected the unilateral settlement made by the 
Russians.  The Russians, fearing another European coalition 
like the one that opposed St. Petersburg in the Crimean War, 
accepted an invitation by Bismarck to settle the dispute in 
Berlin. .The Congress of Berlin, meeting from June 13 to 
July 13 in 1878, modified the San Stefano treaty 
considerably.  Macedonia was returned to the Ottoman Empire, 
and Bulgaria was to be split in two.  North of the Balkan 
mountains would be an autonomous region under an elected 
Bulgarian prince.  The area south of the Balkan mountains 
(eastern Rumelia) would fall under the direct military and 
political control of the Sultan.  Austria was given the 
rights to occupy Bosnia and Hercegovina, and the Sanjak of 
Novi Pazar (a strip of territory between Serbia and 
Montenegro). 
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Although Russia and Bulgaria were deprived of their 
spoils, the damage had been done.  Bulgaria now saw the San 
Stefano treaty as its Magna  Carta  and the frontiers of that 
treaty as its manifest destiny.41  In addition, as Douglas 
Dakin observes, it also caused great dissatisfaction among 
the Balkan nations and again focused their attention on the 
struggle for Macedonia: 
Bulgaria, because it was a part of a prize; Serbia, 
because her principal expansion must be towards the 
southeast now that Austria had acquired the right to 
occupy and annex Bosnia and Herzegovina; and Greece, 
because of the numerous Slav-and Greek-speaking 
patriarchists who lived in that region.42 
The period following the Congress of Berlin has been 
characterized as a Balkan detente.  Except for the Bulgarian 
annexation of Eastern Rumelia in 1885, the struggle for 
Macedonia shifted to nationalist organizations and 
underground activities that ranged from proselytizing and 
propaganda to terror.  At first, these nationalist 
organizations formed along cultural and religious lines, 
with the apparent intention of deepening national 
consciousness.  For instance, the Bulgarians founded the 
Cyril and Methodius Society in 1884; the Serbs established 
the Society of St. Sava in 1886; and the Greeks formed the 
41Ibid., p. 16. 
42Dakin,   Unification of  Greece,   p.   134 
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National Society in 1894.43 Evangeios Kofos says that the 
aims of the National Society "were to assist the Greek 
consciousness, and to prepare them—and Greece—for the 
eventuality of a war against Turkey."44 
By the early 1890's, this military emphasis became the 
means of choice among some nationalist groups.  Small para- 
military units formed, which advocated the use of force to 
accomplish their unifying nationalist aims.  In 1893, the 
Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) was 
formed.  Its goal was to "gather into one entity all 
discontented elements in Macedonia and the area of the 
Aegean, regardless of nationality, in order to achieve, by 
means of revolution, complete political autonomy for these 
areas. "45 
Although the IMRO's motto was "Macedonia for the 
Macedonians," it was quite apparent that its mainly 
Bulgarian membership desired Macedonian autonomy as a 
prelude to union with Bulgaria.46 However, the Bulgarian 
43Jelavich, History of the Balkans: Twentieth Century, 
p. 93. 
44Kofos, Nationalism and Communism, p. 30. 
45Ibid., p. 25. 
46For a detailed account of IMRO organization and 
objectives, see Dimitrije Djordjevic and Stephen Fischer- 
Galati, The Balkan Revolutionary Tradition, pp. 178-180; 
Barbara Jelevich, History of the Balkans: Twentieth Century, 
pp. 93-95; and Evangeios Kofos, Nationalism and Communism in 
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Government found it difficult to control the IMRO's 
revolutionary tactics, and made an attempt  to install a new 
revolutionary organization in Macedonia that would conform 
with its manifest destiny—the reestablishment of the San 
Stefano treaty's Greater Bulgaria. 
This new organization was the Macedonian External 
Organization or the Supremists.  The Bulgarians believed 
that an autonomous Macedonian region would be annexed to the 
Bulgarian state just as the autonomous East Roumelia had 
been in 1885.47 
Operating with the support of the Bulgarian army and 
government, both groups caused a great deal of suffering and 
unrest in the Macedonian region.  This anarchy stemmed from 
the disengagement of the Ottoman government and the Great 
Powers.  The crumbling Ottoman government and army were not 
capable of restoring law and order, and the Great Powers 
were preoccupied with their own internal problems. 
Finally, after a large scale revolt (the lüden revolt) 
in August of 1903, the Turkish armed forces were able to 
defeat the rebels.  This was a turning point in Greek and 
Serbian efforts to secure part of the Macedonian region. 
Confirming this shift, Kofos says: 
Macedonia, pp. 25-28. 
47Wilkinson,   Maps   and  Politics,   p.   151 
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The Greek Government clearly realised that Macedonia 
was in danger of being lost by default to the 
Bulgarians, and that neither the Great Powers nor the 
Ottomans could be trusted to safeguard the rights of 
the Greeks in the region.  The moment had riped for the 
Greek counter-offensive to take a concrete form.  Thus, 
the crushing of the 'lüden' uprising ushered in the 
'Macedonian Struggle,' which in turn prepared the way 
for the liberation of Macedonia ten years later.48 
However, the revolutionary organization's defeat in 
1903 did not put a stop to its activities in the Macedonian 
region.  IMRO members regrouped and pursued their aim of 
"uniting all Macedonians in one state."  This is a 
significant factor in the Balkan mind-set of perceptions and 
misperceptions.  The Greeks consider the IMRO's support for 
the Greek and Slavic Communist forces during the Greek Civil 
War of 1946-1949 as an attempt to annex the Greek Macedonian 
territory.  Greek perceptions of the IMRO have been 
influenced by this long history of a unifying Macedonian 
nationalism, which advocates a diaspora-annexing policy.49 
It is quite clear that Greece's reaction to FYROM's 
independence is related to the active involvement of the 
successor to IMRO, known as VMRO-DPMNE in FYROM's current 
domestic politics, and the danger Greece still perceives in 
the aspirations of the IMRO and its successor. 
48Kofos, Nationalism and Communism, p. 33. 
49Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism," p. 12, 
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As mentioned above, during the period following the 
Congress of Berlin, the Great Powers turned their attention 
away from the Eastern Question in the Balkans and turned 
inward, as in the case of Austria, which was preoccupied 
with its nationality problems, or pursued imperialist claims 
elsewhere, as Russia did in the Far East.  However, this 
lull did not satisfy the appetites of Balkan nationalists. 
And like many Balkan disputes and irredentist claims 
throughout history, the solution was usually determined 
through war. 
On October 8, 1912, the combined forces of Bulgaria, 
Greece, Serbia, and Montenegro attacked the Ottoman Empire 
with an overwhelming numerical superiority, initiating the 
race to acquire the Macedonian and Thracian lands.  The 
Bulgarians absorbed most of the major fighting in Thrace 
against most of the Turkish massed forces, while the Serbs 
pressed in a south-southeast direction and the Greeks moved 
north-northeast.  The Turks could not contain this combined 
attack and were driven from their Balkan territories.  Upon 
the consolidation of the victory,  the Bulgarians found 
themselves the "odd man out," as Greece and Serbia had won 
in the race to occupy key terrain in Macedonia. 
With Bulgaria not satisfied with its spoils of victory, 
it declared war on Greece and Serbia on June 16, 1913.  This 
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second Balkan War lasted for approximately one month and was 
very costly for the Bulgarians.  At the Treaty of Bucharest 
in August 1913, Greece and Serbia turned out to be the big 
winners.  Greece acquired southern Macedonia and parts of 
Epirus, and Serbia received the central and northern 
Macedonian territory located on Greece's new northern 
border.  Again, Bulgaria's hopes of consolidating the 
Macedonian region for itself were dashed.  Bulgaria would 
ardently look for an opportunity to rectify the situation on 
its behalf, and such an opportunity was just around the 
corner. 
This opportunity for the Bulgarians to fulfill their 
dream of securing the frontiers of the San Stefano treaty 
was provided during World War I.  Unfortunately for the 
Bulgarians, they allied themselves with the losing side. 
With the defeat of Germany and the other Central Powers, 
Bulgaria again lost territory to the Greeks and Serbs, a 
loss formalized on this occasion in the Treaty of Neuilly 
(1919) .  In addition, the Bulgarians had to pay a war 
indemnity and limit the size of their military and security 
forces.  This treaty was humiliating for the Bulgarians, and 
caused deep resentment and enmity toward the Greeks and the 
Serbs. 
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The victors, on the other hand, took full advantage of 
the right to self-determination, which President Wilson 
espoused in his Fourteen Points for Europe.  The outcome 
created new ethnic mixes and new borders that only fueled 
the fire of irredentism with those who were not satisfied 
with' their boundaries. 
D.  YUGOSLAV POLITICAL MUTATION AND THE STRUGGLE FOR 
MACEDONIA 
World War II had similar consequences for the 
Bulgarians, as they sided again with the Germans and the 
losing side.  However, a new circumstance emerged in the 
struggle for Macedonia at the conclusion of World War II. 
As Evangelos Kofos points out, "with the termination of the 
war, the.initiative in dictating the course of Macedonian 
developments passed from the Bulgarians to the Yugoslavs. 
Under Tito, it was Yugoslavia's turn to strike for a one- 
sided solution to the Macedonian problem."50 This had to be 
done with caution since Yugoslav Macedonia still had a pro- 
Bulgarian national consciousness, owing to the years of 
Bulgarian propaganda and indoctrination from the 1870's 
until the end of the second Balkan War in 1913. 
Not only was this a delicate maneuver with a pro- 
Bulgarian population, but Tito also had to deal with this 
50Kofos, Nationalism and Communism, p. 292. 
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sensitive situation cautiously because of his intentions to 
curb Serbian dominance and hegemony in the region and within 
the federation of Yugoslavia, and to acquire the Macedonian 
region.  In the end, Tito manipulated the situation 
brilliantly.  He managed geographically to slice away the 
Macedonian territory obtained by the Serbs during the Balkan 
and World Wars, and to transform it into the new People's 
Republic of Macedonia.  To add legitimacy to this new 
republic, Tito asserted that the locally spoken Bulgarian 
dialect was a new "Macedonian" language.  Tito also 
established a Macedonian Orthodox Church.  This represented 
a break with the past Serbian, Greek, and Bulgarian Orthodox 
Churches and provided a new "Macedonian" national 
consciousness through religious affiliation in the same 
manner as the other churches had done in the past.  A 
mutation of history was also accomplished by linking the 
"Macedonian" people with the ancient Macedonian Empire and 
Alexander the Great. 
Finally, Tito instilled an irredentist vision within 
the new republic with the provocative declaration of the 
right of all the Macedonian people to unite.  In a speech 
given in Skopje in the People's Republic of Macedonia, on 
October 11, 1945, Tito said: 
We will never renounce the right of the Macedonian 
people to be united.  This is our principle and we do 
37 
not abandon our principles for any temporary 
sympathies.  We are not indifferent to the fate of our 
brothers in Aegean Macedonia and our thoughts are with 
them.  We will steadfastly defend the principle that 
all Macedonians must be united in their own country.31 
This proposition was basically understood by the Greeks and 
Bulgarians as a Yugoslav Macedonian threat to annex Greek 
and Bulgarian Macedonia. 
In fact, Tito's aims of unifying the Macedonian region 
and securing an Aegean outlet played an important role in 
his support of the communist forces in the Greek Civil War. 
Tito believed that a communist government in Greek Macedonia 
would be willing to relinquish territory to Yugoslav 
Macedonia in exchange for military assistance.  Confirming 
this interpretation of Tito's intentions, CM. Woodhouse 
says that: 
The communist-led Democratic Army was supported from 
Tito's territory by military supplies, training, and 
recruits, and by safe harbors north of the Greek 
frontier, which the Greek National Army was debarred 
from crossing.  By the end of the civil war, half the 
manpower of the Democratic Army were Slavs recruited 
either from Tito's Makedonija or from the Slav- 
Macedonian minority in Greece...There is no doubt that 
if Tito had had his way, Greater Macedonia would have 
been established with its capital as Salonika, the port 
on the Mediterranean that Stalin also desired.52 
However, with the Tito-Cominform split and the entry of 
the United States into the Greek Civil War in 1947, the 
51 Ibid., p. 152 
52C.M.Woodhouse, "Recognizing 'Macedonia' Defies 
History," Christian Science Monitor, 28 October 1992, p. 19. 
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momentum turned in favor of the Greek government.  Two years 
later, the civil war ended, with most of the defeated forces 
leaving Greece for Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania.  Along 
with the defeat of the Greek communist forces (Greek 
Communist Party-KKE), and the Slavic-speaking forces 
(National Liberation Front-NOF) that were organized and 
manned by Slavs from Yugoslav and Greek Macedonia, came the 
defeat of Tito's vision of annexing Greek Macedonia. 
From 1949, when the Greek communist forces were 
defeated, until 1991, when Yugoslavia began to dissolve, the 
Macedonian question was put on hold within the East-West, 
bipolar struggle dominated by the United States and the 
Soviet Union.  Nationalist visions and dissatisfactions 
regarding borders were sacrificed at the altar of stability 
within the Soviet sphere of influence that ruled a major 
part of the Balkans for nearly forty-five years.  Since the 
breakdown of that international security order, the world 
has become aware of long-standing dissatisfactions regarding 
borders between neighboring countries and former Yugoslav 
republics in the Balkans and the revival of old patterns of 
conflict.  Nearly every Balkan country has irredentist 
claims against its neighbors. 
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E.  FYROM* s "VACUUM EFFECT" IN THE RENEWED STRUGGLE FOR 
MACEDONIA 
Once again, the Macedonian region is at the forefront 
of competition and irredentism in the southern Balkans.  A 
weak FYROM has emerged from the Yugoslav breakup as a great 
temptation to its neighbors.  Not surprisingly, Bulgaria was 
one of the first to recognize FYROM's independence in 1991. 
Confirming the fact that their vision for a "Greater 
Bulgaria" has not faded, the Bulgarians in 1991 changed 
their national day to March 3rd.  The significance of this 
day is that on March 3, 1878, the Treaty of San Stefano was 
signed, granting Bulgaria almost the entire Macedonian 
region.53 
Not. wanting to be left out, the Serbs also have claims 
to what they call "South Serbia."  With the justification of 
an allegedly oppressed Serb minority of approximately 
500,000 in FYROM,54 and with Serbia's aspirations to recover 
its lost territory, the Serbian President proposed a 
partition of FYROM between Greece and Serbia.  The Greek 
Prime Minister is reported to have declined the offer and to 
"Christopher Hitchens, "Minority Report: Greece and 
Macedonia," The Nation, May 2, 1994, v258, nl7, p. 583(1). 
54
"Greece Will Not Go to War Over Serbia," Zagreb 
VECERNJI LIST, 29 Jun 1994 (FBIS-EEU-94-129, 29 Jun 1994), 
pp. 6-7. 
40 
have reported the Serbian suggestion to the European 
Union.55 In the west, Albania poses a serious threat to 
FYROM's territorial integrity due to the large ethnic 
Albanian minority in FYROM (some estimate between 20 to 40% 
of the population).  For example, Duncan M. Perry says that 
"the Albanian liberation movement has formed a terrorist 
offshoot in western Macedonia called Unikom.  This 
organization advocates the use of violence to resolve the 
Albanian question in Macedonia."56 Besides the territorial 
claims in western FYROM, Albanian nationalists also envision 
a larger Albanian state — consisting of Albania proper, 
parts of Montenegro, and the Serbian-controlled province of 
Kosovo, where 90% of the population is ethnic Albanian. 
Greece, on the other hand, has waged an unsuccessful 
battle to prevent the recognition of FYROM by the European 
Union, the United States, and the United Nations.  Greece's 
efforts and disappointments in this respect have fueled the 
fire of competitive hyper-nationalism and have added to the 
"spiraling effect."  Greece and FYROM, have used ambiguous 
assurances and provocative gestures.  Both appear to be 
engaging in alliance-building with regional powers. 
55Duncan M. Perry, "Macedonia: A Balkan Problem and a 
European Dilemma," RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 1, no. 25, 
19 June 1992, p. 44. 
56Ibid., p. 38. 
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The historical antecedents in the struggle for 
Macedonia point to the recurrence of irredentist claims and 
the rise of hyper-nationalism when the strategic region of 
Macedonia is weak in relation to its neighbors.  What was 
true in the late 19th and early 20th centuries about the 
"vacuum effect" of Macedonia is true today.  FYROM's 
weakness is currently a great temptation to its neighbors. 
And with.all of its neighbors, except perhaps for Greece, 
claiming FYROM or parts of it as a piece of their historic, 
greater empire, the situation has become extremely dangerous 
and explosive.  As the predicament currently stands, only 
war between the dissatisfied parties or intervention by a 
third party that is willing to use its power or prestige 
could settle the disputes and claims over Macedonia. 
However,, in this century alone the precedent has been set: 
war has won over diplomacy in the various rounds of the 
struggle for Macedonia by the score of five to nothing. 
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III.  THE "SPIRALING EFFECT" OF BALKAN HYPER-NATIONALISM 
These historical antecedents and the anarchic setting 
of this region have molded a strategic culture in which 
ethno-national groups view their neighbors as threatening. 
According to John J. Mearsheimer, in such a setting 
"benevolent nationalism frequently turns into ugly 
hypernationalism—the belief that other 'nations or nation- 
states are both inferior and threatening and must therefore 
be dealt with harshly."57  Chauvinist mythmaking has a 
tendency to follow such a belief system, which allows states 
to rationalize their provocations on the basis of moral and 
legal rights. 
Many of these hyper-nationalist tendencies and the 
consequent political implications stem, as has been 
suggested,  from a strategic culture common to the Balkan 
region.58  The strategic culture of the Greeks has been 
deeply influenced by the Byzantine empire, by the period of 
Ottoman domination (1453-1830), by the struggle for 
independence in the 19th century, and by wars and chronic 
economic and political insecurity during the 20th century. 
57John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability 
in Europe After the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 
15, No. 1 (Summer 1990), p. 21. 
58For a definition of "strategic culture" by Ken Booth 
see footnote 4. 
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Another factor influencing Greek strategic culture is 
the dominant value of philotimo  or "love of honor."  This 
concept of philotimo  in Greece does not have an equivalent 
value in West European countries.  In Greece, philotimo 
measures "a man's worth in terms of his success in 
fulfilling kinship obligations and in protecting the 
extended family from real or imaginary threats emanating 
from a hostile physical and human environment."59  In 
contrast, in countries such as Britain and France, the 
dominant value system places an emphasis on individualism 
and man's responsibility and loyalty to the nation-state. 
In this West European value system, individuals are judged 
by their personal integrity.  However, in Greece, 
individuals are judged on whether they have philotimo.60 
As a result, Greeks tend to view the world in Hobbesian 
terms of struggle and uncertainty.61 S. Victor Papacosma 
describes how the individual Greek has endured this outlook 
59Adamantia Pollis, "The Impact of Traditional Cultural 
Patterns on Greek. Politics," The Greek Review of Social 
Research, Vol. 29, 1977, p. 3, quoted in S. Victor 
Papacosma, "Politics and Culture in Greece," Institute for 
Social Research (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1988), 
60Adamantia Pollis, "Political Implications of the 
Modern Greek Concept of Self," British Journal of Sociology, 
Vol. 16, 1965, p. 34. 
"Papacosma, "Politics and Culture," p. 1. 
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and its subsequent results by relying: 
On an ingroup composed primarily of the extended 
family, friends, friends of friends, and those people 
concerned with his welfare, for security and 
advancement.... [and] in the hostile world, successes, 
failures, conflicts, and relationships with people and 
authorities are viewed in ingroup-outgroup terms.62 
Given a perception of the world as permeated with "real 
and fabricated conspiracies" extending from a hostile 
environment (outgroup), the Greek mindset "naturally breeds 
distrust, suspicion, and rumors."63 The experience of 
approximately 400 years of Ottoman occupation, a bloody 
struggle for independence, and six wars during this century, 
which involved behind-the-scenes exploitation by the Great 
Powers, helps to explain the  fatalistic psyche of the 
Greeks and their sense of vulnerability to the threat or use 
of force.-  This may also explain why Greece spends more on 
defense as a percentage of GNP than any other NATO country, 
including the United States. 
Partly because of this underlying Balkan strategic 
culture and value system, hyper-nationalism has led to a 
"spiral model" pattern of conflict in the Macedonian 
region.64  It appears that the strategic culture of the 
Balkans and the hyper-nationalist tendencies in the region 
62Ibid., pp. 1, 9, 
"Ibid., p. 7. 
64Van Evera,   "Primed for  Peace," p.   24 
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create a strong propensity for political elites to embrace a 
"spiral model" pattern of behavior in international 
relations.  The very policies that spiral theorists believe 
are inclined to raise the level of tension in disputes— 
"development of potent and flexible armed forces, a 
willingness to fight for issues of low intrinsic value, 
[and] avoidance of any appearances of weakness"65—have been 
implemented in the Macedonian region today. 
The "spiral model," as described by Robert Jervis, is a 
theory based on the "anarchic setting of international 
relations," and is a result of "living in a Hobbesian state 
of nature."  Jervis says that "in such a world without a 
sovereign, each state is protected only by its own strength. 
Furthermore, statesmen realize that, even if others 
currently harbor no aggressive designs, there is nothing to 
guarantee that they will not later develop them."66  In this 
anarchic setting of the spiral model, an act of self- 
protection by one state may be viewed as offensive by 
another and may lead to an arms race, or worse, to a 
preemptive attack.67 
65Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in 
International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1976), p. 84. 
66Ibid., p. 62. 
67Ibid., pp. 63-67. 
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The "Hobbesian state of nature" is, of course, 
omnipresent in international relations, but may be qualified 
by power configurations of remarkable stability that provide 
a measure of order.  In the Balkans, such order has usually 
been imposed by outside powers.  The withdrawal—or 
perceived disengagement—of such powers since the end of the 
Cold War in 1989-1991 has made the anarchic "state of 
nature' in the Balkans more fluid and has made Balkan 
strategic culture a stronger determinant of political 
behavior. 
This type of behavior and assessment by political 
elites and statesmen is most often influenced by the 
traumas, wars, and other experiences that have been 
weathered by the state (or nation) in its past. 
Perceptions, images, and theories may then be developed from 
these past experiences.  Frequently, ambiguous information 
and complex events are filtered through these existing 
theories, with the outcome being a distorted perception from 
a preconceived expectation.68 
It is not surprising that Balkan strategic culture 
lends itself to the type of distorted processing of incoming 
information found in the spiral model—that is, a conflict- 
exacerbating exchange of messages and, at least in some 
'Ibid., p. 472. 
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cases, misperceptions aggravating mutual mistrusts.  The 
peoples of the Balkans have not recovered from the traumas 
they have experienced over the centuries.  Concerning this 
factor, Stephen Van Evera writes that "the scope of the 
dangers posed by past crimes is a function, in part, of 
whether these crimes are remembered, and whether victims can 
attach responsibility for crimes to groups that are still 
present. "69 
An example of this factor is present in the conflict 
raging in other parts of the former Yugoslavia.  For . 
instance, the Serbian populations in Croatia and Bosnia- 
Herzegovina reacted in part to their memories of Croatian 
nationalism during World War II and remembered in particular 
their fellow Serbs who were killed by the Ustashi.  Even the 
remembrance of their defeat by the Ottomans on the Kosovo 
battlefield in 1389 was invoked by Serbian political elites 
to instill nationalist sentiments in the Serbian people. 
The cultures and religions of East and West meet in the 
Balkans.  The contrasting Judeo-Christian tenets of an "eye 
for an eye"70 and "love your enemies"71 found in the Old and 
New Testaments confront and struggle with each other for 




supremacy.  Describing Greece's cultural foundation and 
quite possibly the Balkan culture as well, Nikos Kazantzakis 
wrote: 
Following the tradition of reason and empirical 
inquiry, the West bounds forward to conquer the world; 
the East, prodded by frightening subconscious forces, 
likewise darts forward to conquer the world.  Greece is 
placed in the middle; it is the world's geographical 
and spiritual crossroads.72 
It is difficult for Westerners to comprehend Balkan manners 
and culture, especially when Westerners expect a response 
that mirrors their own cultural traits. 
Many historical traumas in the Macedonian region and 
throughout the Balkans are still vivid memories.  The 
Bulgarian initiative to acquire the Macedonian region in 
1878, the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, World War I and II, the 
Greek-Turkish Wars of 1922-1923, and the Greek Civil War in 
1946-1949 are all examples of open wounds that have not 
healed.  Balkan nations and states have been scarred by 
these wars,•occupations, and subsequent assimilation 
programs.  This sensitivity to past traumas may explain why 
conflicts surrounding the struggle for the Macedonian region 
have often led to "self-fulfilling prophecies and the 
spirals of misperception and hostility."73 
72Nikos Kazantzakis, Report to Greco (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 1965), quoted in Robert D. Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts 
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), p. 231. 
73Jervis, "Hypotheses on Misperception," p. 484. 
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Being locked in a "spiraling" relationship may also 
explain why Greece and many other Balkan countries, which 
are influenced by a similar strategic culture, seek other 
means to insure security for their national borders and 
institutions.  Since these states live in a "Hobbesian state 
of nature" where no sovereign exists, there is a great 
danger that "the belief that there is a high degree of real 
conflict will create a conflict that is no longer 
illusory."74  It appears that this perception (or 
misperception) in Balkan politics comes to the fore when 
external powers, such as Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman > 
Empire during most of the 19th century and NATO and the 
Soviet empire during the Cold War, are no longer imposing a 
quasi-peace on the Balkans and when there is a threat to the 
delicate balance of power in the Macedonian region.  Both 
conditions seem to have emerged since the breakup of the 
former Soviet Union and of the former Yugoslavia in 1991. 
A.  BALKAN BALANCE OF POWER 
Currently, the balance of power in the Balkans has not 
shifted to the hegemonic advantage of one country or 
coalition.  However, a potential problem has arisen because 
of the "vacuum effect" created by the weakness of the FYROM, 
and because of the shift in'the strategic balance of power 
74Jervis, Perception and Misperception, p. 77. 
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that would result if Serbia, or Bulgaria, or even Greece 
filled this void.  Since 40% of the strategically important 
Macedonian region is found in present day FYROM, the 
acquisition of this territory would enhance the geostrategic 
prospects of a potential hegemon in the Balkans. 
Because the FYROM's military weakness could tempt 
aggressors, this is a realistic possibility.  As a result of 
the heightened state of hyper-nationalism and tension in the 
relations among the Balkan powers (Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria, 
and Serbia), deliberate moves against hegemons or 
threatening alignments have been initiated in response to 
real or perceived threats.  This posturing centers on the 
historic animosities and differences in the geopolitical 
aims of Greece, Serbia, and to a lesser extent, Bulgaria, 
with Turkey's role and interests in the Balkans. 
The Turkish armed forces total over 500,000 active duty 
personnel, with over one million in the reserves.  This 
makes it the second largest armed force in NATO.75  In 
addition, the modernization of Turkey's armaments and the 
receipt of CFE-surplus equipment have made the Turkish armed 
forces numerically and qualitatively superior to any others 
in the Balkans.76  Despite the end of the Cold War and the 
75Graham E. Fuller and Ian 0. Lesser, Turkey's New 
Geopolitics (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), p. 118. 
76Ibid., pp. 119-121. 
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movement of former Soviet forces eastward, Turkey still 
maintains a center of gravity toward Europe rather than Asia 
and the Mid-East."7 
This strategic focus may change with new threats coming 
from the Caucasus, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and the Kurdish 
minority in southeastern Turkey.  But so far there has been 
no change in the size and quality of Turkish forces in 
Thrace.  Ian 0. Lesser suggests that Turkey has not 
repostured its armed forces in Thrace "because of the 
perceived value of Turkish military superiority in deterring 
the mistreatment of Muslim minorities in Bulgaria, Greece, 
and elsewhere in the Balkans."78 An estimated 80,000 ethnic 
Turks reside in FYROM, along with Muslim ethnic Albanians in 
FYROM, the province of Kosovo, and Albania proper.   This is 
certainly a strong consideration for the Turkish government, 
because it has received pressure from its domestic 
population and from the Muslim world to take the lead as the 
protector of the Balkan Muslims.  The main factor 
influencing the Turkish force levels in Thrace is, however, 
power politics—the need to prevent the emergence of a 
Balkan hegemon that would threaten Turkish leverage and 
77Ibid., p. 11.4. 
78Ibid., p. 114 
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interests in the Balkans/9 
B.  BALKAN ALLIANCES AND THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS 
To counter and compete with Turkey's military 
superiority and to maintain its own power position, Greece 
has embarked upon an armaments race that has lasted since 
the 1950's, and that has been largely supported by U.S. 
equipment and financing.  Greece has also relied upon its 
position within the NATO alliance.  With the threat of a 
Russian invasion diminished, and the new roles of NATO in 
international security still being worked out, the. 
effectiveness and commitment of NATO partners appears to be 
diminished as.well. 
The combination of all the factors mentioned above— 
Balkan hyper-nationalism, the "vacuum effect" of a weak 
FYROM, the changes in security arrangements in Europe, the 
strategic culture of the Balkan powers, and the military 
superiority and interests of Turkey—helps to explain how 
the states within the Macedonian region have become locked 
into a "spiraling" relationship.  These factors have also 
contributed to the rebuilding of traditional Balkan 
79The militant Islamic Welfare Party now controls 
Ankara, Istanbul and other Turkish cities, and threatens 
Turkey's 71 years of secular leanings.  For a detailed 
account see "Muslim Party's Growth Posing Challenge to 
Turkey's Secular Heritage," New York Times, November 30, 
1994, p. A8. 
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alliances.  The situation has also led to more provocative 
actions and threats that undermine prospects for a 
diplomatic settlement to the claims and ambitions of several 
Balkan countries. 
This predicament is where Greece finds itself today. 
Since the recognition of FYROM by the United Nations 
Security Council on April 7, 1993, Greece has closed its 
northern border with FYROM.  Moreover, alliances have been 
formed that parallel those in the early Balkan Wars of 1912- 
13.  Describing these alliances, Robert D. Kaplan says that: 
There is the north-south Byzantine configuration made 
up of the Orthodox Christian world:  Greece, Serbia, 
Russia, and even Romania, where water-sharing 
agreements and a resurgence of Orthodox-related fascism 
are pulling it closer to the Serbian orbit. Then there 
is the east-west Muslim alliance of Turks and 
Albanians, both in Albania-proper as well as in Kosovo 
and Macedonia.  As in the past, this grouping is backed 
by Croatia.80 
These alliances are not just hypothetical, but are currently 
being discussed openly by Balkan political elites.81 An 
example of cooperation among Orthodox countries is the 
creation of a Greek-Russian religious and cultural 
association.  This association includes the clergy, 
80Robert D. Kaplan, "Ground Zero," New Republic, August 
2, 1993, p. 15. 
81For further accounts regarding Balkan alliances see_ 
"Divisions in Foreign Policy Outlook," Athens TA NEA, 3 
January 94 (FBIS-WEU-95-014, 23 January 94, and "Against 
Orthodox Bloc," Vienna PROFIL, 21 Mar 94 (FBIS-EEU-94-055, 
21 Mar 94), p. 72. 
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scholars, businessmen, doctors, lawyers, journalists, and 
members of youth clubs." 
It is not surprising that these two alliances intersect 
in the culturally divided land of FYROM, which now can be 
seen as a possible battleground between diverging 
civilizations.  These diverging civilizations in the Balkans 
meet at what Samuel P. Huntington describes as cultural 
fault lines, which form a separation between the Catholic- 
Protestant West, the Orthodox East, and the large Muslim 
populations.83 This new political system of relations in 
Europe, based on cultural fault lines (religion, language, 
and nationality) and not on ideology, is what Huntington 
says is "replacing the political and ideological boundaries 
of the Cold War as the flash points for crisis and 
bloodshed."84  Concerning Huntington's hypothesis, Kaplan 
writes that "the Balkans, a powder keg for nation-state war 
at the beginning of the twentieth century, could be a powder 
keg for a cultural war at the turn of the twenty first: 
82
"Orthodox Greek-Russian Association," Athens I 
KATHIMERINI, 15 August 93 (FBIS-WEU-93-376, 25 September 
93) . 
"Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?," 
Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993, pp. 29-30. 
84Ibid. 
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between Orthodox Christianity...and the House of Islam."85 
The significance of these alignments and formations is 
vital in the understanding of Balkan conflicts today, since 
they are embedded in Balkan history and culture dating back 
to the 4th century A.D.  Three milestones in history have 
contributed to the cultural fault lines found in the Balkans 
and the present appeals to form alliances along these lines. 
The first occurred in 324 A.D. when the Roman Emperor 
Constantine decided to move the capital eastward to the city 
of Byzantium.  It was at Byzantium that Constantine built 
the new capital, Constantinople, which was named after 
himself.  Timothy Ware says that "the motives for this move 
were in part economic and political, but they were also 
religious:  the old Rome was too deeply stained with pagan 
associations to form the center of the Christian Empire 
which he had in mind."86 This was the first step in the 
east-west division of the Roman Empire, and the first step 
to separate the two along religious and cultural lines. 
The second major separation occurred approximately 
fifty years after the death of the Emperor Constantine and 
after the death of his successor, Theodosius I, in 395 A.D. 
85Robert D. Kaplan,'"The Coming Anarchy," Atlantic 
Monthly, February 1994, p. 62. 
86Timothy Ware, The Orthodox Church (Baltimore: Penguin 
Books, 1973), p. 27. 
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In that year the empire was divided in two parts, each going 
to one of Theodosius's two sons.  Commenting on this 
division, John V.A. Fine says that: 
Though in theory they were colleagues and it was still 
one empire, from here on the empire was never united in 
fact.  The two different civilizations developed on 
their own:  Latin and Greek (eventually each with its 
own Christian church).  After the Slavic invasions of 
the late sixth and seventh centuries cut off east-west 
communications ...these differences became even 
greater, making it impossible for the two to agree on 
certain major issues again.87 
Despite attempts to mend disagreements between Rome and 
Constantinople, the final split came in the summer of 1054 
A.D.  It was in this year that the "great schism" occurred 
between the Orthodox east and the Latin west.  Thus the 
cultural lines became more cemented, with the Balkans 
becoming the border or buffer zone between the two 
civilizations. 
The third and last event that helped to define today's 
Balkan cultural fault lines was the Ottoman conquest, which 
led to new Great Power rivalries in the Balkans.  In 1453, 
Constantinople fell to the Ottomans, as did the last Emperor 
of Rome.  Shortsightedness on the part of the Christian 
leaders of Europe and their lack of consensus would soon 
result in dire consequences for the continent.  Barbara 
87John V.A. Fine, The Early Medieval Balkans (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1983), p. 15. 
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Jelavich says that: 
The collapse of the Byzantine state and the taking of 
the great imperial city was an event of tremendous 
significance.  The chief citadel of Eastern 
Christianity and the heir to Roman power and splendor 
was occupied by a Muslim Turkish conqueror.  It was now 
to become the capital of a new empire, which was based 
on quite different principles.88 
Less than one hundred years later, the Ottomans would lay 
siege to Vienna (1529) and threaten the Austrian Empire. 
This competition for supremacy and territory in southeastern 
Europe would characterize the Balkan situation until the 
20th century. The main contenders included the Muslim 
Ottoman Empire, the Catholic Austrian Empire, and the 
Orthodox Russian Empire. 
Since these Great Power rivalries further strengthened 
cultural fault lines, alignments by Balkan countries 
subsequently followed along this pattern.  Not surprisingly, 
these same alignments can be observed forming today.  With 
regard to FYROM, the alignments along cultural fault lines 
are unquestionable.  The Orthodox countries of Greece and 
Serbia have allied themselves against FYROM, but not for 
identical reasons.  For Greece, an apparent usurpation of 
history and culture and the threat of irredentist claims by 
FYROM are at the core of the matter.  In contrast, the Serbs 
88Jelavich, History of the Balkans: Eighteenth and 
Nineteenth Centuries, p. 32. 
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have their own irredentist claims on what they consider as 
"southern Serbia," which was annexed from them by Tito in 
1944. 
Opposing this Orthodox alliance is a Muslim alliance 
headed by the Ottoman successor state, Turkey.  Allied with 
Turkey in the struggle for dominance in the Macedonian 
region are the Albanians, of which 70% are Muslim.  Along 
with Turkey, Albania is now a full participant in the 
Islamic Conference Organization and is receiving financial 
assistance from other Islamic countries.89  In addition, 20- 
40% of the population in FYROM are ethnic Albanians, as well 
as 90% of the population in Kosovo, and both these groups 
are overwhelmingly Muslim.  The Albanians have the highest 
population growth rate in Europe, a circumstance that 
enhances prospects for greater Muslim influence.90 The 
Greeks in particular feel threatened by the prospect of 
being surrounded by Muslims, and would prefer to have an 
Orthodox Serbia as a northern neighbor rather than what they 
perceive as a menacing  "Islamic arc." 
89For more information regarding Islam and Albania, see 
Frances Trix, "The resurfacing of Islam in Albania," East 
European Quarterly, Winter 1994, and Larry Luxner, "Islamic 
resurgence in Albania," The Middle East, December 1992. 
90Fuller and Lesser, Turkey's New Geopolitics, pp. 147- 
148. 
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Not surprisingly, the odd man out in this equation of 
Balkan alliances is Bulgaria. ■ Bulgaria has had a long 
tradition of postponing alliance decisions, with a view to 
making choices that will benefit Bulgarian ambitions. 
Although considered an Orthodox country, Bulgaria's policies 
have been influenced more  by its assessments of its 
national interests than by its cultural ties with Orthodox 
countries.  For example, when the medieval Bulgarian King 
Boris converted to Christianity in the 9th century A.D., he 
entertained the notion of accepting a Frankish mission (from 
the Latin Church in Rome) and alliance instead of the 
Orthodox Church in Constantinople.  Boris eventually was 
persuaded and was baptized by the Orthodox Church, but only 
after the Byzantines launched an armed force toward 
Bulgaria.91 
In both World Wars, Bulgaria sided with the Central and 
Axis Powers led by Germany.  The Government in Sofia favored 
this alliance because it provided the best opportunity to 
acquire the Macedonian region and fulfill its desire for a 
"Greater Bulgaria."  Bulgaria has coveted this region ever 
since losing this nationalist dream by the decisions made by 
the Great Powers in the Treaty of Berlin (1878).  If 
Bulgarians are still motivated by their "manifest destiny" 
91Fine, The Early Medieval Balkans, pp. 118-119. 
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of regaining the "Greater Bulgaria" afforded to them in the 
San Stefano Treaty of 1878, which current nationalist 
indications confirm, then the Bulgarians will ally 
themselves with the power that appears most likely to be 
able to help them achieve their objectives.  This power will 
probably be Turkey, since Greece and Serbia would not accept 
a balance of power shift to Bulgaria's advantage. 
C.  THE REEMERGENCE OF GREAT POWER POLITICS 
Great Power politics within the European Union play a 
role in this conflict concerning the Macedonian question and 
the Balkans.  Since the end of the Cold War, the pressure 
has increased to replace the old bipolar political system 
with a new one that more accurately reflects the current 
situation.  The disappearance of the Soviet threat has 
removed the single most important unifying factor in 
European security affairs.  No clear common interest has 
appeared to unite the reemerging national interests of 
European nation states, except for the inertia of 
institutions such as the EU and NATO. 
European security would be endangered if NATO evolved 
from a successful collective defense arrangement to a 
support organization for a collective security pact with an 
ill-defined threat to focus on.  Within a collective 
security pact, members would be expected to resist every 
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aggressor since everyone's security interests would be 
affected by any aggression on the continent.  This would 
place the once unifying external focus of collective defense 
on the internal processes and military policies of each 
nation-state within an abstract collective security 
arrangement.  However, an arrangement of this kind in Europe 
would ignore the Clausewitzian premise of the "paradoxical 
trinity."  Concerning the "paradoxical trinity," Clausewitz 
wrote that: 
The passions that are to be kindled in war must already 
be inherent in the people; the scope which the play of 
courage and talent will enjoy in the realm of 
probability and chance depends on the particular 
character of the commander and the army; but the 
political aims are the business of government alone.92 
In his theory on war, Clausewitz argued that only with 
an equilibrium between the government, the armed forces, and 
the people can victory be realized to its fullest potential. 
These three elements working together are so significant, 
Clausewitz argued, that "a theory that ignores any one of 
them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship between them 
would conflict with reality to such an extent that for this 
reason alone it would be totally useless."93 An abstract 
collective security arrangement in Europe would ignore the 
92Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Sir 
Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1984) p. 89. 
93Ibid. 
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element of the people in the "paradoxical trinity" and the 
"passions that are to be kindled in war." 
An expectation of cooperation among NATO members 
regarding collective security operations under United 
Nations auspices would be unrealistic in this perspective, 
since popular sentiments differ in the member nations.  Such 
operations would only stress intra-alliance differences all 
the more.  NATO's support for the United Nations involvement 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina is a good example of this point.  NATO 
has for the first time offered "out of area" military 
support to a collective security arrangement such as the 
United Nations.  This has magnified the divergence of 
opinion between NATO members on the belligerents involved, 
and has helped cause a fractured response to the conflict 
that is raging in this region. 
Other obstacles have surfaced that are now eroding 
political, economic and military cohesion in Western Europe. 
These obstacles have taken the form of unilateral decisions 
that only highlight differences between NATO and EU nation 
states.  Due to the absence of a clear unifying threat, 
Germany's ambassador to NATO says that "today, individual 
alliance partners or groups have greater freedom to push 
through their interests, and NATO is instrumentalised for 
this purpose...As a result we see a blurring of the 
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partners' stance that was previously held and determined 
jointly."94  Germany's unilateral insistence on recognizing 
Croatia and Slovenia, over British and French objections, 
illustrates this tendency to pursue national interests over 
alliance consensus.95  Leaders in Germany's CDU, one of the 
parties in the governing coalition, have also proposed a 
two-tiered plan of economic integration that could make some 
countries "second-class members of the Union."96  In 
addition, the United States decision to honor but not 
enforce the military embargo of Bosnia opened a huge rift 
between Washington's policy and that of its European 
allies.97 
Another factor may erode European cohesion—uncertainty 
about continued U.S. security commitments in Europe.  More 
than two-thirds of the approximately 340,000 U.S. military 
personnel present in Europe in 1990 have been removed.  With 
the U.S. Government split between domestic priorities and 
94Baron Herman von Richthofen, "Cracks are appearing in 
the alliance," Financial Times, December 3, 1994 
95
"U.N. Yields to Germany on Yugoslavia, Following Lead 
of France and Britain,"  New York Times, December 16, 1991, 
p. A12. 
96Stephen Kinzer, "German Plan for European Union 
Brings Protests,"  New York Times, September 4, 1994, p. A4. 
""Clinton Defends Halting Bosnia Arms Embargo 
Enforcement," New York Times, November 15, 1994, p.  Al. 
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Strategie concerns,98 United States reliability and 
commitment are now being questioned by the European allies. 
For instance, Baron Herman von Richthofen says that: 
France is accusing the U.S. of defacto non-enforcement 
of surveillance of the arms embargo, and is demanding a 
comprehensive evaluation of all embargo infringements 
at sea, on land and in the air, in the apparent 
expectation that this will show the unreliability of 
the U.S." 
Therefore, in Europe, there is a great, temptation to 
return to the multipolar political system of the past.  In 
fact, Great Power alliances reminiscent of past wars have 
reemerged, and have called the European Union's solidarity 
into question.  Robert D. Kaplan suggests that two alliances 
have formed that are similar to World War II coalitions.100 
He says that the alliances include Germany, Austria, Italy 
and Turkey (the old Axis-Central power arrangement.) on the 
one hand, and Great Britain, France, Russia, and the United 
States on the other.  Kaplan concludes that "whatever the 
reasons, as on previous occasions in this century, the same 
98An amendment offered by Mr. Frank of Massachusetts in 
the U.S. House of Representatives linked U.S. troop strength 
in Europe with NATO member contribution levels.  For a 
detailed account, see U.S. Congress, House, Congressional 
Record, Amendment Offered by Mr. Frank of Massachusetts, May 
19, 1994, pp. H3735-H3746. 
"Baron Herman von Richthofen, "Cracks are appearing in 
the alliance,"  Financial Times, December 3, 1994, p. 3. 
v   
100Robert Kaplan,   "Ground Zero,"  New Republic,   August  2, 
1993,   p.   15. 
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people are supporting the same people, proof of how 
geography and the mysteries of culture can triumph over mere 
politics . "101 
Have the past alliances, described above, and the 
cultural similarities actually supplanted the European 
Union's political solidarity?  Kaplan's thesis has yet to be 
proven correct, but these political alignments may explain 
the coolness of some European Union members, especially 
Germany, concerning Greece's claims about the Macedonian 
question. 
Great Britain and France have both formally recognized 
FYROM.  However, of the four major powers in the European 
Union (Great Britain, Germany, France, and Italy) , only 
Great Britain and France have consistently supported Greece 
throughout its modern history.  From the beginning of 
Greece's movement toward independence in the early 
nineteenth century, the British and French have offered 
assistance in various ways, such as "the founding of the 
London Greek committee in 1823, the raising of the. first 
Greek loan in England, the arrival of British philhellenes 
in Greece, and the French military mission in 1884. "102 
101Ibid. 
102Dakin,   The Unification of Greece,   pp.   52,145, 
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The relationship was deepened by the sacrifices shared 
by Britain, France, and Greece during the two World Wars. 
This shared history and commitment to similiar political 
ideals have also been important because most Balkan states 
rely heavily on a patron-client system for protection. 
Until 1947 and the advent of the Truman Doctrine, Britain 
was expected to protect and safeguard the Hellenic Republic 
of Greece.  After 1947 and until recently, Greece looked to 
the United States for such protection. 
In contrast, Greece and Germany fought on opposite 
sides during the two World Wars, and Greece was even 
attacked and occupied by German armed forces during World 
War II.  However, these facts are not the primary 
explanation for the recent Greek-German discord.  The 
reasons behind their impaired relationship include the 
recent renewal of their traditional political and cultural 
alliances within the Balkans, their competing economic 
interests in the region, and Greece's continued economic 
strain on the European Union. 
As mentioned above, Greece has effectively allied 
itself with Serbia, at least on a political level (No formal 
treaty of alliance has been made public).  This is a 
traditional relationship, based on shared national interests 
and culture.  The Greek-Serbian partnership first took shape 
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in the nineteenth century, when both countries were fighting 
for independence from the Ottoman Empire.  The partnership 
continued in the twentieth century during the Balkan and 
World Wars, and has now resurfaced as an important strategic 
association. 
The Serbian-Russian relationship is also grounded in 
historic and cultural ties.  Serbians and Russians speak a 
similar Slavic language and are closely linked by the 
Eastern Orthodox Christian faith.  Furthermore, both have a 
close historical association in the pan-Slav movement of the 
19th century.  Russia came to the aid of Serbia in the 
Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878), and Russia sided with Serbia 
against Austria-Hungary and Germany in World War I.  It is 
worth recalling that Russia, after two humiliating defeats 
(the Crimean War and the Russo-Japanese War), turned to the 
Balkans and to pan-Slavism for its new geopolitical pursuits 
and ideology. 
A similar nationalist pan-Slav movement is again 
gripping a prostrate Russia, as she seeks a new identity 
after the Cold War.  As in the past, Russia is again 
embracing a foreign policy that is anti-Western in tone and 
that highlights cultural affinities in the Balkans.  Duncan 
M. Perry says that "in Russia, pan-Slavic rhetoric is being 
articulated by conservative politicians, legislators, and 
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others who shape public opinion, and it can be seen as one 
aspect of reemergent Russian nationalism."103 Russia's pan- 
Slavism has taken the form of support for the Serbian 
position in the Yugoslav conflict.  For instance, in March 
1994, the lower house of Russia's legislature, the State 
Duma, voted 280 to 2 in favor of lifting Russia's embargo on 
Serbia.104  Russian "volunteer battalions" and mercenaries 
are reported to be fighting on behalf of Serbia in Bosnia, 
and Russian newspapers are imploring Russians to assist 
their Slav brothers in Serbia.105 
Besides their ethnic links, the Russians and Serbs have 
a cultural bond that has reemerged as a powerful force since 
the collapse of the Soviet system. It is within the Russian 
and Serbian Orthodox Churches that a unifying nationalist 
identity has been preserved throughout the era of communism. 
About the Russian Orthodox Church, James H. Billington says 
that: 
With the collapse of the world's first atheist state, 
the historic religion of Russia has emerged as the 
central cultural force in the country's new national 
103Duncan M. Perry, "Serbian-Russian Relations: 
Pragmatic and Politic,"  RFE/RL Research Report, March 19, 
1993, p. 2. 
104Laurie Laird, "Shared history: Serbia's ties to 
Russia," Europe: Magazine of the European Community/ June 
1994, p. 19. 
105Suzanne Crow, "Russia Adopts a More Active Policy, " 
RFE/RL Research Report, March 19, 1993, p. 5. 
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self-consciousness.  As a cohering ideology, Orthodoxy 
has replaced communism as the lodestar of Russian 
society.106 
As in the 19th century, today's pan-Slav movement is 
based not only on ethnic grounds but also on religious ones. 
Culture is again at the forefront in the Balkans, and 
religion is the biggest discriminating factor.  The question 
remains:  Will Russia again see itself as the protector of 
the Orthodox Christians in the Balkans and seek a 
predominant role in some sort of federation?  The potential 
and means are present.  No other "Great Power," such as 
Great Britain, which constantly kept an expansionist Russia 
from enlarging its sphere of influence in the Balkans during 
the 19th century, is present to prevent a resurgent 
nationalist Russia from achieving an Orthodox alliance. 
However, there is a conceivable conflict of interest in the 
region, which may draw deeper lines in an east-west, 
Orthodox-Protestant/Catholic confrontation. 
Germany has aligned itself with Croatia.  Germany was 
the first country to recognize Croatia as an independent 
state with the right to secede from Yugoslavia, and did so 
unilaterally in 1991, though the U.S., other EC governments, 
106James H. Billington, "The Case for Orthodoxy,"  New 
Republic, May 30, 1994, pp. 24-25. 
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and the U.N. Security Council objected.107  The Germans have 
long historical ties with the Croats and Slovenes through 
the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and today "nearly two-thirds of 
the 600,000 Yugoslav 'Guest Workers' in present-day Germany 
are of Croatian origin."108  The Germans and the Croats were 
allied during World War II by the Tripartite pact of March 
25, 1941.  And on April 10, 1941, according to T.W. Carr, 
The 14th Panzer division rolled into Zagreb 
enthusiastically welcomed by Croatians.  Within hours, 
working to a well-prepared plan, Dr. Edmund Vesenmager 
(Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop's envoy from Berlin) 
proclaimed on Zagreb radio the formation of the . 
Independent State of Croatia (ISC) under Poglavnik 
(leader) Ante Pavelic.109 
The outcome of the new ISC under Pavelic and the 
appointment of Archbishop Alojsije Stepinac as Senior 
Military Chaplain by Pope Pius XII, was the sanctioning of 
the Ustashi.  The Ustashi, according to T.W. Carr, was used 
to kill a million "Serbs, Jews, and Gypsies, and to 
forcefully convert another 250,000 to Catholicism."110  This 
interpretation of history is the basis of what many Serbs 
107
"Countdown to Recognition,"  Economist, December 21, 
1991, p. 57. 
108
"U.N. Yields to Germany on Yugoslavia, Following Lead 
of France and Britain," New York Times, December 16, 1991, 
p. A12. 
109T.W. Carr, "For Serbians, Fears of a German Axis Rise 
For The Third Time This Century," Defense & Foreign Affairs 
Strategic Policy, December 31, 1992, p. 16. 
110Ibid. 
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have been led to believe is another attempt by a supposed 
German, Croat, and Vatican "Axis" to repeat what occurred 
during World War II. 
Is Germany seeking European dominance along historical 
and cultural lines?  With unification, Germany has become a 
force to be reckoned with, not only in Europe, but in the 
world arena as well.  Misha Glenny argues that: 
There appears little doubt any more that Germany wishes 
to establish itself as primus inter pares  in Europe. 
However, in contrast to past attempts by Germany to 
assert its supremacy in Europe, it has neither the 
means nor the intention of doing so by force of arms. 
In addition, it has no need.  Its chosen instrument is 
economic expansion.111 
Robert Mark Spaulding's research confirms a continuity 
in German history of applying trade leverage to pursue 
political purposes in Eastern Europe.  Spaulding writes that 
the preconditions for applying German trade leverage are 
present in most forms.  For instance, Spaulding says: 
Trade-based diplomacy in the East has depended on an 
anarchic or highly politicized international trade 
regime that would allow Germany to bring its full 
economic advantage to bear on the less developed 
Eastern countries by approaching them on a bilateral 
basis and employing a full range of sanctions or 
inducements.u2 
mMisha Glenny, "Germany fans the flames of war," New 
Statesman & Society, December 20, 1991, p. 14. 
112Robert Mark Spaulding, Jr., "German trade policy in 
Eastern Europe, 1890-1990: preconditions for applying 
international trade leverage," International Organization, 
Summer 1991, p 366. 
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D.  EU SOLIDARITY OR REALPOLITIK? 
The Greeks and the Germans, although partners in the 
European Union, have clashed concerning the Macedonian 
question and interests in the Balkans.  However, it is not 
only the German-Croat and Greek-Serbian relationships that 
are causing problems, but also the German-Turkish/Muslim 
connection that is spilling over into the Macedonian 
question.  Positive German-Turkish relations have been 
deliberately fostered since the nineteenth century, with 
political, economic, and military dimensions.  This 
background, together with the animosity between Greece and 
Turkey throughout the centuries, complicates German-Greek 
relations.  Turkey is a member of NATO, but also desires 
European Union membership.  So far, Turkey has been excluded 
from membership, but, as Ian 0. Lesser explains, "Germany is 
widely viewed as the one country that could successfully 
promote Turkey's application for membership in the EC."113 
Greece views Turkey as seeking regional power status in 
the Balkans.  Turkey's aim in the Balkans, at least in some 
Greek analyses, is to legitimize its role in Europe, and 
thus to be seen as a Western-facing nation rather than an 
Oriental/Mideast one.  Commenting on this view, Miltiadhes 
113Fuller and Lesser, Turkey's New Geopolitics, p. 110. 
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Evert says that: 
The first axis of Ankara's foreign policy aims at 
assuring the world that Turkey is becoming or appears 
to be a factor of influence over Balkan developments 
and is the protector of all Muslims in the region. 
This policy is a direct outgrowth of Turkey's desire to 
play a European role and to be a serious actor in the 
evolving European scene.  In short, a role in the 
Balkans assures and legitimizes Turkey's Western 
orientation and its European agenda.114 
Examples supporting this interpretation of Turkish aims 
in the Balkans include Turkey's immediate recognition of 
FYROM in 1991, the February 1994 trip of the Prime Ministers 
of Turkey and- Pakistan to Sarajevo and Skopje, and their 
offer of 300,000 Muslim troops to augment the U.N. peace 
keeping mission.  The Turks have expressed concern regarding 
the wellbeing of the estimated 20-40% Muslim Albanian 
population in FYROM. 
Not only do Greece and Germany have conflicting 
political and cultural alliances, but they also have 
competitive economic interests.  With the Cold War over, the 
Greeks want to resume business in the Balkans as a whole,■ 
including countries formerly under Communist control. 
Greece has developed some extensive designs for the region, 
designs that would create a Greek zone of economic influence 
in the Balkans comparable to that of Germany in western and 
114Miltiadhes Evert, "Turkey's Strategic Goals: 
Possibilities and Weaknesses," Mediterranean Quarterly, Fall 
1993, p. 31. 
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central Europe. 
The Greek designs include a currency zone based on the 
Greek Drachma, with a banking and financial center in 
Athens, and an industrial and export center in 
Thessoloniki.115 This is the new "Great Idea" of Greece in 
the Balkans.  Whether it is feasible remains to be seen. 
However, Germany's economic weight threatens the role 
Greece desires to play in the Balkans economically and 
politically.  Not only is Germany the leading trading 
partner and foreign investor in Turkey,116 but its trade with 
the countries of southeastern Europe in 1993 has grown, 
according to information from the Federal Economics 
Ministry, "with above average dynamism," and with a forecast 
of "real economic growth."117 Greeks are concerned because 
"Germany is now FYROM's largest trading partner, with a 40- 
percent share of its foreign trade."118 
Finally, the economic competition between Germany and 
Greece for new markets in the Balkans, leads us now to the 
115,,A new Great Idea," Economist, May 22, 1993, p. 13. 
u6Fuller and Lesser, Turkey's New Geopolitics/ pp. 109- 
110 
117
"Eastern Trade Rises Steeply," Munich SUEDDEUTSCHE 
ZEITUNG, 29 July 1994 (FBIS-WEU-94-150, 29 July 1994), p. 
23. 
118
"Kinkel, Skopje's Gligorov on Conflict With Greece," 
Berlin DDP/ADN, 12 August 1994 (FBIS-WEU-94-156, 12 August 
1994) . 
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economic strain that Greece places on the European Union, 
directly, and on Germany, indirectly.  For the Greeks cannot 
dream of fulfilling any of their "Great Ideas," unless the 
European Union subsidizes their economy as in the past. 
Describing Greece's poor economic situation, Folkert Jensma 
says that: 
Last year the country had a 18-percent rate of 
inflation and a government deficit of 96 percent of 
gross GNP.  Salaries tend to rise by an average 20 
percent a year.  A good 15 percent of the working 
population has guaranteed lifelong employment with the 
government in organizations with little purpose.  The 
billions of ECUs which Brussels pumps into the Greek 
economy appear to evaporate immediately.119 
With this poor economic situation, described above, and 
with the requirements for participation in the Maastricht 
Treaty monetary union elusive—indeed, remote—at this point 
for Greece, other European Union members, including Germany, 
are losing their patience with an "intemperate" and 
"irrational" Greek policy on the Macedonian question.. This 
poor economic situation, along with Greece's political 
disputes with its neighbors, appears to be driving Greece 
further from convergence with the EU. 
Consequently, after an initial display of agreement in 
the EU, with the Lisbon declaration, the EU nations of 
119Folkert Jensma, "Brussels Fears Greeks as President," 
Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD, 24 December 1993 (FBIS-WEU-93- 
247, 28 December 1993), p. 5. 
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France, Germany, Britain, and Italy established diplomatic 
ties with FYROM on December 16, 1993.  In response to this 
EU decision and U.N. recognition, Greece closed its northern 
border and imposed a trade embargo with FYROM in February 
1994.  Because of the Greek economic blockade on FYROM, the 
EU has brought Greece before the European Court of Justice. 
This Court made its ruling on June 29, 1994, throwing "out a 
European Union appeal for Greece to lift a unilateral 
blockage against the neighboring FYROM."120 
This is where the situation currently stands.  Both 
Greece and FYROM are building bridges with others in the 
region and in the world, but not between each other.  The 
Greek embargo has pushed FYROM into the arms of the 
Albanians, the Bulgarians, the Germans, and the Turks, all 
among Greece's historic enemies.  Hugh Pope writes that "a 
protocol has been signed in Bulgaria to revive a project 
that...will link Macedonia (FYROM), Albania, Turkey, and 
Bulgaria with a new highway, railway, fiber-optic 
communications network, and natural-gas pipeline."121  In 
addition, the rift between Greece and its EU partners has 
also encouraged FYROM's intransigence regarding the 
120
"European Court Rejects EU Appeal on FYROM Embargo," 
Paris AFP, 29 June 1994 (FBIS-WEU-94-126, 29 Jun 1994). 
121Hugh Pope, "New flash points in the powder keg, " 
World Press Review, May 1994, v41, n5, p. 17. 
77 
mediation effort by Cyrus Vance. 
Thus, a peaceful settlement is currently in the 
opposite direction of where Greece and FYROM appear to be 
heading.  The risk of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
spreading to encompass the southern Balkans is greater today 
than several years ago.  The situation is also not improved 
at all by the formation of alliances and alignments 
consistent with historic patterns, and reflecting 
competitive Great Power geopolitical interests in the 
region. 
These phenomena in diplomacy and alliance-building 
contribute to the instability that already exists in this 
part of the world.  This situation in the Balkans also 
illustrates the emergence of a multipolar system in Europe, 
which is replacing the old bipolar, East-West, Cold War 
relationship.  Clearly this is a critical period in European 
history, and it is imperative that it be mapped out slowly 
and methodically.  It should be recalled that the spark that 
touched off World War I was struck in the Balkans, and the 
contemporary equivalent well might be developing today with 
the volatile Macedonian question. 
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IV.  THE MACEDONIAN "SYNDROME" 
The present conditions are potentially ripe for an 
expanded, high-intensity conflict between Balkan nationalist 
movements.  Greece and the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia (FYROM) are locked in a spiral of heightened 
tensions and hostility.  As mentioned above, this "spiraling 
effect" has been apparent in increasingly aggressive 
provocations, in efforts to uphold perceived rights that 
seem of trivial importance to outsiders, and in the lack of 
any unilateral initiatives for conflict-resolution.  Such 
initiatives appear to be unlikely, because of a general fear 
that they might be interpreted as a sign of weakness.122  In 
addition, the types of nationalism displayed by states in 
the Balkan region are oriented toward incorporating their 
diaspora by means of territorial expansion and annexation.123 
Many now believe that the Macedonian region may be the next 
casualty of war in the continuing Balkan conflict.124 
122The characteristic patterns of the spiral model are 
described in chapter 3 of Robert Jervis, Perception and 
Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 62-113. 
123Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism," pp.5-39. 
124For a detailed analysis regarding a protracted 
conflict in the southern Balkans, see Nikolaos Zahariadis, 
"Is the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia a Security 
Threat to Greece?" Mediterranean Quarterly (Winter 1994), 
pp. 84-105; and Duncan M. Perry, "Macedonia: A Balkan 
Problem and a European Dilemma," RFE/RL Research Report, 
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To illustrate the danger of this conflict igniting into 
war, this chapter compares the current Macedonian question 
with the historical model of international relations and 
political development proposed by Myron Weiner.125 Weiner's 
model suggests that there are characteristic patterns of 
domestic and international development involving an 
irredentist state, a status-quo state (anti-irredentist), 
and a shared ethnic group that is present in both the 
irredentist and status-quo states.  In his model, Weiner 
proposes that these characteristics form a "syndrome," which 
can be used to identify and explain the crisis, predict its 
likely path, and provide recommendations for a solution to 
the problem.126 
This inquiry uses Weiner's model to identify and 
explain the hyper-nationalist quandary in the southern 
Balkans, to outline the possible future of these movements, 
and to suggest recommendations to solve this "spiraling" 
dilemma.  Weiner's model assumes a minimum of three actors— 
an irredentist state, a status-quo state, and a shared 
ethnic group.  The model also emphasizes three conditions. 
First, the shared ethnic group must feel that it is a 
Vol. 1, no. 25, 19 June 1992, pp. 35-45. 
125Weiner,   "The Macedonian Syndrome,"  pp.   665-683 
126Ibid.,   pp.   667,   670. 
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distinct nation.  Walker Connor defines a nation as "a group 
of people who believe  they are ancestrally related."127  In 
other words, this national group must also be aware of its 
own distinct identity in terms of its history, language, 
culture, religion, etc., with relation to the other national 
groups present in the state. 
Second, an irredentist claim (or a perceived claim) is 
made by the revisionist power to incorporate the national 
group.  In characterizing three types of nationalisms, 
Stephen Van Evera would label the above irredentist claim as 
"diaspora-annexing" nationalism.128 According to Van Evera, 
Some nationalisms (the diaspora-accepting variety) are 
content with partial union...Some nationalisms (the 
immigrationist type) seek to incorporate their 
diasporas in the national state, but are content to 
pursue union by seeking immigration of the 
diaspora...Finally, some nationalisms seek to 
incorporate their diasporas by means of territorial 
expansion...Such diaspora-annexing nationalisms are the 
most dangerous of the three, since their goals and 
tactics produce the greatest territorial conflict with 
others.129 
The third, and last, type highlights the political 
significance of the irredentist claim by both the 
127Walker Connor, "From Tribe to Nation," History of 
European Ideas, vol. 13, no. 1/2 (1991), p. 6 (emphasis in 
the original), cited in Daniel Patrick Moynihan, 
Pandaemonium: Ethnicity in International Politics (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 1. 
128Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism," p. 12. 
129Ibid. 
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irredentist and anti-irredentist state.  Although the anti- 
irredentist state may not find the irredentist claim to be 
enforceable in terms of absolute power calculations (armed 
forces, economic indicators, etc.), or justifiable in terms 
of the territorial expanse claimed, it may find the claim to 
be credible if: 
A state's previous unfortunate experience with a type 
of danger [has sensitized] it to other examples of that 
danger.  While this sensitivity may lead the state to 
avoid the mistake it committed in the past, it may also 
lead it mistakenly to believe that the present 
situation is like the past one.130 
Actors and conditions of the types identified by Van 
Evera, Jervis and Weiner are present in the irredentist 
dispute between Greece and FYROM.  Within this analysis, 
FYROM is considered the irredentist state, Greece is the 
status-quo state, and the Slav Macedonians constitute the 
shared ethnic group.  The Slav Macedonians constitute a 
majority ethnic group in FYROM and a minority in Greece. 
As stated above, Weiner's model isolates characteristic 
patterns of political development that form "a syndrome— 
that is, they are generally found together, are causally 
interrelated, and owe their origin to common factors."131 
The following is an analysis of the Macedonian question in 
light of the model presented by Weiner. 
130Jervis, "Hypotheses on Misperception," p. 480, 
131Weiner, "The Macedonian Syndrome," p. 670. 
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A.  REVISIONIST ALLIANCE-BUILDING 
In describing this first characteristic regarding the 
irredentist state, Weiner says: 
The irredentist state pressing for a revision of the 
international boundary will generally attempt to form 
alliances to threaten the state containing the ethnic 
minority.  "Natural" allies are neighboring states of 
the "enemy" and other states that also seek to rectify 
international boundaries, or are anti-status quo with 
respect to the international or regional balance of 
power.132 
FYRÖM has apparently chosen Turkey as its "natural" 
ally.  FYROM's apparent choice of ally is an interesting 
one, because it constitutes more of an "unnatural" rather 
than a "natural" relationship.  It would appear that FYROM's 
choice of ally (Turkey) runs counter to its history (Ottoman 
rule over this region), language (Macedonian), religion 
(Orthodox), and ethnicity (Slavic).  An alliance with Serbia 
or Bulgaria would have better met the "natural ally" 
criteria (assuming that these criteria include a shared 
history, ethnicity, language, religion, etc.). 
Perhaps the most obvious explanation for FYROM's choice 
of ally resides in Serbia's, Bulgaria's, and even Albania's 
irredentist claims on FYROM's territory.  From that 
standpoint, it would be "natural" for FYROM to ally itself 
with Turkey.  Nonetheless, FYROM's alliance with Turkey has 
132Ibid. 
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apparently been realized for two diverse reasons. 
First, FYROM feels threatened by its neighbors, and is 
seeking security guarantees for its territorial integrity. 
From this standpoint, FYROM may be allying with Turkey for 
fear of threats to its territorial integrity. Since FYROM 
is extremely weak in terms of its military and economy, it 
would stand to reason that it would seek out allies. 
This perspective, seen from a purely aggregate power 
point of view, is consistent with hypotheses on why states 
form alliances in a "balancing" relationship.133 However, 
this relationship leaves FYROM vulnerable from another 
standpoint.  FYROM is acting from a position of weakness 
with regard to Turkey.  As Stephen M. Walt has pointed out, 
"allying, with the strong side...gives the new member little 
influence and leaves it vulnerable to the whims of its 
partners."134  What makes FYROM vulnerable, from this 
133Stephen M. Walt provides hypotheses on balancing in 
"Alliances: Balancing and Bandwagoning," in International 
Politics, ed. Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis (New York: 
HarperCollins, 1992), pp. 70-77.  The following propositions 
summarize Walt's hypotheses on why states balance: 1) States 
facing an external threat will align with others to oppose 
the states posing the threat; 2) The greater the threatening 
state's aggregate power, the greater the tendency for others 
to align against it; 3) The nearer a powerful state, the 
greater the tendency for those nearby to align against it; 
4) The greater a state's offensive capabilities, the greater 
the tendency for others to align against it; 5) The more 
aggressive a state's perceived intentions, the more likely 
others are to align against that state. 
134Ibid., p. 71. 
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standpoint of a weaker partner, is the possibility of Turkey 
coercing FYROM to pursue a revision of the international 
boundary with Greece when it may not want this revision. 
According to the second interpretation, which is 
supported in this model, FYROM actually has an irredentist 
claim on Greek territory and is posturing and allying itself 
with a regional power to achieve that goal.  This is the 
Greek perception (or misperception) of what is occurring 
concerning FYROM's use of the name "Macedonia" and of 
symbols which Greece regards as a usurpation of its past.135 
Not only does Greece perceive this convergence of interests 
between FYROM and Turkey, but it actually expects this 
challenge.  According to Nikolaos Zahariadis, "FYROM is 
expected.to welcome Turkey's role as a regional benefactor 
and protector, given Skopje's internal political and 
economic weakness and historical rivalries with other 
regional powers."136 
Whether it has been perceived or expected, indications 
of a "special" relationship between FYROM and Turkey have 
been manifest in recent high-level visits by Turkish 
officials to FYROM.  For instance, in his August 1994 trip 
to FYROM and Albania, Husamettin Cindoruk, the speaker of 
135Zahariadis, "Nationalism and Small-State," pp. 663- 
664. 
136Ibid., p. 664. 
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the Turkish Grand National Assembly, said that Turkey's 
national policy towards FYROM was based on "respect for its 
territorial integrity and the inalienability of its borders, 
as well as on Macedonia's [FYROM's] natural right to choose 
its own name and flag, which has a historical background."13' 
Since Greece has been sensitized by a strategic culture 
that is based on Hobbesian (or anarchic) assumptions, its 
analysis of the Turkey-FYROM relationship may exaggerate its 
significance.  That is, Greece's processing of ambiguous 
information regarding the Turkey-FYROM relationship may be 
distorted by its beliefs about Turkey's intentions in the 
Balkans and FYROM's intentions in Greece.138 
This phenomenon is a common problem for governments, 
which may tend to "place a square peg in a round hole" 
concerning incoming facts and information.  Therefore, 
governments may make errors in judgement because, as Jervis 
says, "the evidence available to decision-makers is almost 
always very ambiguous since accurate clues to others' 
intentions are surrounded by noise and deception. 11139 
137
"Turkish National Assembly Speaker on Joint Ties," 
Belgrade TANJUG, 7 Aug 94 (FBIS-EEU-94-153, 7 Aug 94). 
138Robert Jervis, "Hypotheses on Misperception, " p. 472 
139Ibid., p. 474. 
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B.   ANTI-IRREDENTIST ALLIANCE BUILDING 
Greece's perception of a coordinated "attack against 
Orthodoxy and Hellenism" by Turkey through FYROM and 
Albania140, and the subsequent negative shift in the once 
stable (bipolar) Balkan balance of power, have resulted in 
what Weiner identifies as the second characteristic of the 
"Macedonian syndrome" in political development and 
international relations.  In describing this second 
characteristic, Weiner writes: 
The anti-irredentist state with the ethnic minority 
will respond by attempting to form defensive alliances 
to preserve existing borders.  "Natural" allies are 
neighbors of its irredentist neighbor and other powers 
that for one reason or another wish to preserve the 
status quo.141 
Greece, the anti-irredentist state in this model, has 
responded with an apparent alliance with Serbia.  As 
mentioned above, Greece feels threatened by what it 
perceives as FYROM's plans to annex the northern Greek 
province of Macedonia.  The expected response, from a 
traditional balance of power theory, would be to form 
alliances that would "balance" against the perceived 
140
"A Finger in the Hole in the Dam Wall," Skopje PULS, 
3 Jun 94 (FBIS-EEU-94-110, 3 Jun 94), p. 6. 
141Weiner, "The Macedonian Syndrome," pp. 671-672. 
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threat.142 With Greece's historic protector (the U.S.) seen 
as disengaging from Europe, Greece has turned to a regional 
power, Serbia, as a partner in resisting perceived 
Macedonian claims.  This opinion regarding the reliability 
and commitment of the United States to Greece and Europe is 
widely held in Greece.  For instance, Stathis Evstathiadhis 
says : 
Many U.S. politicians have repeatedly requested the 
President to delink the United States from Europe...it 
is important to know whether Greece is aware that 
Washington is 'abandoning us, if it has not done so 
already.'  Athens must look in its immediate area to 
find the 'friendly powers' whose intervention every 
Greek Government hopes will solve the national issues 
that periodically emerge.143 
Unlike FYROM's alliance with Turkey, Greece's alliance 
with Serbia conforms more to a "natural" alliance 
definition.  Greece and Serbia have a common cultural 
background, share the same historic enemies, and have a 
tradition of alliances with one another in the Balkans. 
Contrary to Weiner's explanation of this "natural" ally's 
intentions, however, Serbia is widely believed to want to 
change the Balkan balance-of-power in its favor if given the 
opportunity.  Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic has been 
reported to have proposed the partition of FYROM between 
142For a detailed summary of hypotheses on balancing, 
see Stephen M. Walt, footnote 12. 
143
"Greece-U.S.-Europe Triangle Discussed," Athens TO 
VIMA TIS KIRIAKIS, 17 Jul 94 (FBIS-WEU-94-145, 28 Jul 94). 
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Greece and Serbia.  The Greek Prime Minister at the time, 
Konstantinos Mitsotakis, declined the offer and reported the 
Serbian proposition to the European Union.144 
Kiro Gligorov, the President of FYROM, confirmed this 
apparent alliance between Greece and Serbia during a June 
1994 interview discussing regional relations.  When asked if 
the coordination between Greece and Serbia violated the 
Bucharest agreement of 1913, Gligorov said that "it is well 
known that the Serbs are supported by the Greek government 
and politics."145  Later, when asked if the plan of some 
Greek political actors for a common Greek-Serb border would 
have been realized if it were not for the "Turkish danger," 
Gligorov said that it "would suit the Serbs."146 
C.  GREAT POWER POLITICS AND SUPPORT 
Great power politics regarding support for newly- 
independent Balkan states following the collapse of the 
Ottoman Empire set precedents comparable to the dilemmas 
facing newly independent Balkan states after the collapse of 
Yugoslavia.  Which great powers are eager to expand their 
144Duncan Perry, "Macedonia: A Balkan Problem and a 
European Dilemma," RFE/RL Research Report, 19 June 1992, p, 
44. 
145
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spheres of influence in the Balkans through support to 
regional states?  This is what Weiner proposes in his third 
characteristic: 
Neighboring states and larger, more powerful countries 
are often drawn into irredentist disputes, sometimes to 
endorse the claims of one side or the other, sometimes 
formally to join one of the alliances, sometimes simply 
to establish more trade with, provide more assistance 
to, or become friendlier with one state rather than the 
other.14' 
Two.separate developments occurred that involved great 
power politics and support, which appeared to many Greeks to 
support FYROM and to "upset the regional balance of power by 
strengthening FYROM's hand."148  The first involved the 
decision by the United States to deploy peacekeeping troops 
in FYROM.  In Greek eyes, this decision gave the appearance 
of legitimacy to a state not diplomatically recognized by 
the United States and the Eurpean Union.  Consequently, the 
deployment of U.S. soldiers on FYROM's soil created the 
impression that the United States, through the United 
Nations, had taken sides in the dispute between Greece and 
FYROM, even though the U.S. troops were deployed along the 
FYROM border with the Serb-dominated "rump Yugoslavia" and 
were evidently intended to deter Serbian aggression against 
FYROM. 
147Weiner,   "The Macedonian Syndrome,"  p.   672. 
148Zahariadis,   "Nationalism and Small-State,"  p.   665, 
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The second development, which Zahariadis called 
"another tilt in regional' power," came when six European 
Union countries and the United States officially recognized 
FYROM in December 1993 and early 1994.  At least for the six 
European Union members, this recognition ran counter to 
their earlier decision, under the Lisbon declaration in 
1992, not to recognize FYROM with any mention of the name 
"Macedonia." Again, this decision gave the appearance of 
support for FYROM despite Greek claims and the obligations 
of solidarity within the European Union. 
These two developments have resulted in a Greek 
perception of bias that deviates from Greek interests.149 
Many Greeks have concluded that their assessments of 
Greece's.foreign relations disputes are not shared by 
German, French, or British observers.  Many Greeks have 
also concluded that most of their European Union partners 
will emphasize the need to protect and support small Balkan 
countries (FYROM and Albania) that depend substantially on 
Western aid.150 Kostos Beis contends that "West Europeans 
have stopped discussing borders, devoted attention to 
economic development, and see no reason simply because they 
149
"Greece Does Not Provoke, " Athens I KATHEMERINI, 23 
Sep 94, (FBIS-WEU-94-185, 23 Sep 1994), p. 1. 
150
"Even Harder Days for Greece in Europe, " Athens I 
KATHIMERINI, 17 Jul 1994 (FBIS-WEU-94-139, 17 Jul 1994), p, 
11. 
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ire Greece's friends, to 'adopt our enemies as their 
ff 151 
To counter the Western European bias, Greece has turned 
to the United States for support and to the powerful Greek- 
American lobby in Washington.  Describing a meeting with the 
President on March 9, 1994, Hanna Rosin says that: 
Clinton, Vice President Al Gore and national security 
adviser Anthony Lake met with (lobbyist) Andrew 
Manatos, Senator Paul Sarbanes, Greek Orthodox 
Archbishop Iakovos and thirteen other prominent Greek- 
Americans; no one from the State Department was 
invited.  Afterward, Clinton announced he would wait to 
put an embassy in Skopje until the dispute with Greece 
was resolved.152 
With this signal from the United States, Greece has 
attempted to use its U.S. "bargaining chip" as leverage in 
the European Union, and to defer to U.S. policy in the 
region.  But some Greek observers argue that this Greek 
foreign policy decision was short-sighted.  Regarding 
Greece's ties to U.S. policy in the Balkans, K.I. 
Angelopoulos says: 
[Greece] opted for a Balkan policy based on the 
assumption that U.S. strategic goals in the area and 
U.S. desire for stability in the Southern Balkans were 
closer to Greek interests than Germany's ambitious and 
'aggressive' policy...problems [still] remain 
unresolved and Greek foreign policy does not dovetail 
151Editorial Report on Greek Foreign Policy (FBIS-WEU- 
94-185, 23 Sep 1994). 
152Hanna Rosin, "Greek Pique," New Republic, 13 June 
1994, p. 11. 
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with either EU or U.S. positions.  Germany and the 
United States both support Turkey, [and] maintain the 
same positions on the FYROM.153 
It appears that Greece is becoming more isolated on its 
Balkan foreign policy, with no great power backing its views 
and interests in the region.  This, however, has not been a 
total surprise to Greek officials, since no great powers 
gave Greece full support during its bloody independence 
struggle in the 19th century.  In any case, Greece's 
isolation will certainly reinforce the assumptions of 
decision-makers in the Greek government who possess a 
Hobbesian outlook on international relations. 
D.  IRREDENTIST CLAIMS AND THE SHARED ETHNIC MINORITY 
The next characteristic involves the impact of 
irredentist claims on the shared ethnic minority.  With 
regard to this characteristic, Weiner says: 
As the irredentist power expresses its concern for the 
status of the ethnic minority in the neighboring state, 
hope grows within the ethnic minority that it will be 
incorporated into the revisionist state or that, with 
the support of the revisionist power, it may achieve 
separate statehood.154 
153Editorial Report on Greek Foreign Policy (FBIS-WEU- 
94-185, 23 Sep 1994).  For a similiar analysis, see "U.S. 
Follows 'Policy of Varying Distance,'" Athens 
ELEVTHEROPIRIA, .28 Sep 1994 (FBIS-WEU-94-189, 28 Sep 1994), 
p. 13. 
154Weiner, "The Macedonian Syndrome," p. 673. 
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A spark in the Balkan powderkeg emanates from the 
perceived territorial claims of FYROM on Bulgarian and Greek 
Macedonian provinces.  FYROM's new constitution disturbed 
the Greeks and brought back an old fear of irredentism. 
According to Duncan M. Perry, 
The Greeks...were troubled by Article 49 of the 
Republic of Macedonia's new constitution.  The relevant 
passage stated that 'the Republic cares for the status 
and rights of those persons belonging to the Macedonian 
people in neighboring countries as well as Macedonian 
expatriates, assists their cultural development, and 
promotes links with them.'  This wording, coupled with 
the openly irredentist position of IMRO-DPMNE, worried 
officials in Athens.155 
FYROM has also chosen some provocative symbols and 
language that incense the Greeks.  The sixteen-point Sun of 
Vergina was chosen as the symbol for the flag of FYROM.. 
However, this symbol was found on what is considered the 
tomb of Phillip II (the father of Alexander the Great)in 
1977 during the excavations of the royal tombs of ancient 
Macedonia.  In addition, maps have been printed in FYROM 
that depict the unification of the Macedonian state at the 
expense of current Greek borders, and currency has been 
produced with the famous White Tower of Thessaloniki (a city 
in Greece) portrayed on its front. 
These symbols and ideas expressed by FYROM are 
perceived by Greece not only as a usurpation of its 
L55Perry, "Macedonia: A Balkan Problem," p. 40, 
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heritage, but also as a threat to its national security. 
Describing the significance of symbols, names, and ideas in 
unifying nationalism, Nicholaos Zahariadis says, 
Symbols, ideas, names, and the historical memories that 
make up the national package have a propensity toward 
exclusivity because they are the ideational mechanisms 
of demarcating communities.  Adopting a particular 
symbol, such as a flag, choosing a certain name, such 
as the name of a country, are some ways of acquiring an 
identity.  Disputes are likely to erupt when symbols, 
ideas, and even history itself becomes contestable-- 
that is, when two or more entities lay claim to the 
same thing.156 
Although these perceived provocations and claims are 
threatening to Greece, they have not hindered Greece's 
effort to assimilate minority populations into its national 
political system.  Two factors have helped Greece in this 
assimilating process.  First, Greece has fought six wars in 
this century alone.  During and after each war ethnic 
populations were exchanged to such an extent that, in some 
cases, the ethnic character of several regions was changed 
dramatically.  Concerning the exodus of "Slav-Macedonians" 
after the Greek Civil War ended in 1949, Evangelos Kofos 
says, 
As with the mass eviction of Greeks from Asia Minor.in 
1922-1923, a great national calamity had its 
beneficial side-effects.  Along with the thousands of 
guerrillas, abducted children and adults, the 'Slav- 
Macedonians '... left the country in large numbers. 
156Nikolaos Zahariadis, "Nationalism and Small-State," 
p. 651. 
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Thus, Greece was delivered of an alien-conscious 
minority which had actively threatened her security and 
internal peace.1=; 
The second factor affecting Greece's assimilation 
process is time.  After the Greek Civil War ended in 1949, 
the Greeks had approximately forty unhindered years to 
assimilate their ethnic populations into a Greek national 
political culture.  Only since Yugoslavia's collapse, and 
the subsequent international attention drawn to the conflict 
between FYROM and Greece, has there been an increase in 
hostility toward Greek efforts to assimilate a Slav- 
Macedonian minority group. 
The Greek Government does not recognize a separate 
ethnic "Macedonian" people, and consequently does not 
recognize that an ethnic "Macedonian" minority exists in 
Greece.  The Greeks assert that Slav-speakers, or 
"Slavophones" possessing a Greek national consciousness, 
represent a small group in Greece.  The U.S. State 
Department estimates that between 10,000 and 50,000 Greek 
citizens still speak a Slavic dialect, with a few 
identifying themselves as "Macedonians."158  "Macedonian" 
157Kofos, Nationalism and Communism, p. 186 
158 11/ 
'Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1992, 
U.S. Department of State, February 1993, p. 795, as quoted 
in "The Macedonians of Greece," Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, 
April 1994, p. 13.  Although this report sheds light on the 
possibility of minority rights violations in Greece, it 
takes a careless approach in filtering the possible biased 
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activists in Northern Greece estimate the ethnic 
"Macedonian" population of the Greek Macedonian province at 
approximately one million, while the Government of FYROM 
estimates the population at 230,000 to 270,000.159  Despite 
the numbers cited, there appears to be evidence that some 
Greek citizens possess a "Macedonian" rather than a Greek 
national consciousness, and are hostile to national 
integration efforts by the Greek state.  Whether this 
hostility is a result of FYROM's supposed or actual 
irredentist claims and the hoped-for incorporation of a 
"Macedonian" minority into FYROM is unknown at this point. 
E.  RESPONSES BY THE ETHNIC MINORITY TO IRREDENTIST CLAIMS 
Weiner says there are three possible responses by the 
ethnic minority to irredentist claims: 
First, the minority can accept the existing 
international boundaries, strive for improving its 
status within the country in which it is a minority, 
and press for improved relations between the two 
countries, viewing itself as a "bridge" of possible 
friendship.  Second, the minority can be ardently 
committed to union with its kinsmen across the border 
by supporting the claim of the irredentist power.  Or 
and distorted facts and information quoted by organizations 
and sources.  The report should at least have explained the 
inclination of such groups and organizations to use hyper- 
nationalist propaganda.  In that way, quotes such as those 
referring to ethnic populations (pp. 5-6, footnotes 10, 12) 
could first be analyzed with the source in mind, and not 
just be considered fact. 
159
"The Macedonians of Greece, " Human Rights 
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third, if the ethnic group is a minority in both 
countries, it may favor union in a single state of its 
own.150 
It is unclear which response has been supported by 
those who consider themselves ethnic "Macedonians" in 
Greece.  However, Weiner does suggest that if the ethnic 
group is a majority in one state and a minority in the 
other, then there will be a strong inclination for the 
minority group to unite with the state in which that ethnic 
group is in the majority.161  This assessment would suggest 
that the "Macedonians" of Greece would want to merge with 
the 65% of FYROM's population who also consider themselves 
"Macedonian."162 What is evident, in spite of the 
speculation regarding mergers and independent nationhood, is 
the. intense debate regarding, the ethnicity and identity of 
those in Greece who consider themselves to be ethnic 
"Macedonians." 
In July 1993, Human Rights Watch/Helsinki conducted a 
fact-finding mission in Northern Greece and FYROM to 
interview those who consider themselves to be ethnically and 
160Weiner, "The Macedonian Syndrome," pp. 673-674. 
161Ibid., p. 674. 
162Zlatko Isakovic and Constantine P. Danopoulos, "In 
Search of Identity: Civil-Military relations and Nationhood 
in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)," in 
Civil-Military Relations in Soviet & Yugoslav Successor 
States, eds. Constantine P. Danopoulos and Daniel Zirker 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), p. 177. 
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culturally "Macedonian."  According to one such individual, 
a member of the human rights group called the Macedonian 
Movement for Balkan Prosperity (MMBP): 
I am a Macedonian.  I am different from other Greek 
citizens.  I have a different culture; I got it from my 
father and my grandfather.  I speak a different 
language...until I was six years old I spoke only 
Macedonian.  Especially in the villages, people talk in 
Macedonian.  The heart of the matter is that we just 
want to be accepted and recognized as a different 
ethnic group.163 
On the other hand, others were interviewed who had a 
"Greek consciousness."  One such individual was Theophilos 
Dafkos, an agronomist whose parents were born in FYROM.  In 
a statement concerning this issue, Dafkos said, 
I speak Macedonian, but I am a Greek.  The people who 
claim to be Macedonian are really Slavs.  There is no 
such thing as a Macedonian nation.  Ninety-seven 
percent of the people in northern Greece are purely 
Greek.  A few people who try to make trouble work 
through the government of Skopje to bring in money from 
Australia and Canada [from Macedonian emigres].  They 
spread propaganda to create unrest in the area and 
divide people.  They try to take advantage of the 
people who speak two languages—they are about 4 0 
percent of the population.  But everyone is Greek.164 
F.  STATUS QUO POWER'S RESPONSE TO IRREDENTIST CLAIMS 
As the intense debate persists over the identity of an 
ethnic "Macedonian" group in Greece, a suspicious reaction 
by the Greek Government is predicted in Weiner's model. 
163
"The Macedonians of Greece, " Human Rights 
Watch/Helsinki, April 1994, p. 14. 
164Ibid., pp. 17-18. 
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Weiner says, "as demands for revision of boundaries on the 
part of the irredentist power persist, the status quo power 
will become increasingly suspicious of the loyalty of its 
ethnic minority whose status is being disputed."165 
Specifically, Weiner predicts that the government would 
react by pursuing policies that would, simultaneously, move 
in two directions.  The first direction would attempt to 
accelerate programs of nationalization—through school and 
religious programs, language requirements, and insistence on 
the use of symbols that imply identification with the 
national government.  The second direction would impose more 
control over the disputed minority.  These measures take the 
form of police surveillance and stricter border 
enforcement .165 
There is evidence that these measures toward minorities 
in general or toward a specific people who consider 
themselves "Macedonian" have either already taken place in 
the nationalization process, or are currently underway, in 
Greece.  For instance, members of the Human Rights 
Watch/Helsinki mission asked Greek citizens who maintained 
an ethnic "Macedonian" consciousness whether a married 
couple could name a child by a Slavic name.  One individual 
165Weiner, "The Macedonian Syndrome," p. 674 
166Ibid., p. 674. 
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said: 
You couldn't possibly do that.  When a baby is born you 
take the birth certificate without a name to the church 
and tell the priest what you want the baby's name to 
be.  The church accepts only Greek names.  So in order 
for the baby to be properly registered with the 
government, you have to give it a Greek name.167 
This policy may not necessarily mean that a child whose 
parents refused to accept a Greek name would be denied 
citizenship.  What it might imply, however, is that the 
parents could be denied a religious ceremony if they 
insisted on a Slavic name.  Whether this is a government/ 
church program to nationalize Greek citizens in a Greek 
Orthodox state is not known.  If this practice does exist, 
it may be comparable to efforts in other Balkan countries 
to assimilate minority ethnic populations through church 
membership and affiliation.  In most Balkan states, if one 
is baptized in a national church, such as the Greek, 
Serbian, Bulgarian, or Macedonian Orthodox Churches,  one 
becomes or is usually regarded in a government census as 
being a "Greek," a "Serb," a "Bulgarian," or a "Macedonian," 
whatever one's actual ethnic identity. 
A program to enforce use of the national language is 
another tendency that Weiner predicts.  It appears that 
there were some restrictions on the use of a "Macedonian" or 
167
"The Macedonians of Greece," Human Rights 
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"local" language in the past.156  This language or "idiom" 
spoken by many who consider themselves to be "Macedonian" is 
different from the Greek language, with most of its 
vocabulary consisting of Slavonic words.  According to 
Nickolaos Zahariadis, "the idiom spoken by Macedonian Slavs- 
-in Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and several villages near the 
border in northern Greece—was known as a Western Bulgarian 
dialect that had noticeable but not significant Turkish and 
Greek influence."169 
The Greek government does not acknowledge that the 
language spoken by those who consider themselves 
"Macedonian" is a language at all.  According to the Greek 
Foreign Ministry, "the idiom spoken in Greek Macedonia is 
identified by local peoples as 'dopia' (i.e., 'local')..-it 
remains an oral idiom, with no written form, grammar or 
syntax...it should not be confused or identified with the 
'Makedonski' of FYROM."170 
However, Human Rights Watch/Helsinki recorded "no 
prohibitions on the use of the ["Macedonian"] language in 
ordinary discourse," with some exceptions, but concluded 
that the Greek Government would not permit the "Macedonian" 
168Ibid., pp. 39-40. 
169Zahariadis,   "Nationalism and Small-State,"  p.   655. 
170
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language or idiom to be taught in private language 
schools.171 According to the report, the Greek government 
also would not register a cultural association called the 
"Center for Macedonian Culture."172  Although there were 
other complaints addressed in the report regarding the Greek 
government's prohibition of "Macedonian" cultural 
activities, the fact-finding mission did attend a folk 
festival in a northern Greek village where "Macedonian 
ethnic dances, as well as dances of other groups, were 
performed without problems."173 
The second direction Weiner predicts involves placing 
more controls on the disputed minority.  Again, the report 
published by Human Rights Watch/Helsinki reveals possible 
evidence of past discrimation and an apparent increase in 
controls.  The controls discussed in the report take the 
form of police surveillance, border enforcement, harassment, 
and coercion.174  The report says, "the Macedonian rights 
activists have been subjected to a good deal of harassment, 
including threats, strip searches, and confiscation of 
documents; they report that they are routinely followed, as 
171Ibid., pp. 36-44 
172Ibid., pp. 20-21 
173Ibid., p. 16. 
174Ibid., pp.49-60. 
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was the July fact-finding mission."1"5 
In addition, the report described two incidents 
involving human rights activists and the release of their 
names for publication in a Greek newspaper by government 
officials.  Both disclosures were published by the Greek 
newspaper "Stohos," which revealed on one occasion the names 
of those who had crossed the border into FYROM, and on a 
second occasion, the names, car license numbers, and 
passport numbers of those involved in interviews with the 
Human Rights Watch/Helsinki fact-finding mission.176  The 
mission concluded that "the fact...police openly followed us 
may have exerted a chilling effect on some ethnic 
Macedonians.  In the climate of fear in which Macedonians 
live in northern Greece, police surveillance discourages 
full cooperation with human rights monitoring groups."177 
G.  REVISIONIST POWER'S OBSESSION AND SENSITIVITY REGARDING 
THE MINORITY ETHNIC GROUP 
Weiner also suggests the probable response of the 
revisionist power to the status quo power's tendency to 
"nationalize" its citizens and to institute tighter controls 
on the minority ethnic group.  According to Weiner, "the 
175Ibid., p. 50. 
176Ibid.,   pp.   54-55  and Appendix H. 
<177Ibid.,   p.   55. 
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revisionist power is easily aroused by steps taken by the 
neighboring state to assimilate, incorporate, integrate, or 
in any other significant (and sometimes insignificant) way 
to affect the status of the minority ethnic group."178 
Normally, this reaction to measures against the minority's 
ethnic identity would be "magnified" by the press, the 
political parties, and the government.  However, FYROM 
cannot afford to do so.  FYROM has a large Albanian minority 
(estimates vary from 20 to 40% of the population) that is 
increasingly demanding rights, and that is suspected of 
harboring secessionist aims.  The government of FYROM must 
also contend with a Serbian minority that claims 
approximately one fourth of FYROM's two million population. 
As a result, it appears that FYROM must temper its 
responses to what it perceives as mistreatment of the 
"Macedonian" minority in Greece and elsewhere so as not to 
display "Macedonian" nationalism, and thus threaten the 
Albanian and Serb minorities, possibly provoking them (and 
Tirana and Belgrade) to dismember FYROM.  Although this is a 
sensitive issue that requires restraint from the government 
and media, reports criticizing foreign governments' behavior 
toward the "Macedonian" minority have been published in 
FYROM.  Most concerns have been voiced by the VMRO-DPMNE 
17BWeiner, "The Macedonian Syndrome," p. 675, 
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(Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic 
Party for Macedonian National Unity), which held the 
majority in FYROM's first assembly in 1991-1994. 
For instance, in an interview the Vice President of the 
VMRO-DPMNE, Dosta Dimovska, said that the basis of friendly 
relations with Greece was dependent on its respect for the 
"Macedonian nation" living within its borders.  Dimovska 
also said that compromise on FYROM's name, flag, and an 
article in its constitution (which refers to a "Macedonian 
nation" in Greece) would not be feasible.  But Dimovska's 
most provocative accusations referred directly to perceived 
injustices against the "Macedonian nation" in Greece. 
Concerning these accusations, Dimovska says, "...we shall do 
our best.to correct the injustices that have been done 
against these people ["Macedonians" in Greece].  Genocide 
should be stopped and their ["Macedonians"] names should not 
have to be changed."179 
Along with its sensitivity regarding a perceived 
discrimination against—and "genocide" of—the "Macedonian 
nation" in Greece, the VMRO-DPMNE has also expressed 
expansive and provocative claims.  Deputies of the VMRO- 
DPMNE have claimed that the "Macedonian" people constitute 
179
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the second largest Balkan population, with 2 million in 
Bulgaria and 1.5 million in Greece.  Assembly Deputy Speaker 
Tito Petkovski said that "Greece has received Aegean 
Macedonia as a gift from [the] great powers in 1913 and that 
it [Greece] has no legitimate rights over that territory."180 
Other foreign acts of discrimination and rights abuses 
against "Macedonians" have been highlighted and magnified in 
FYROM's media.  In March 1994, FYROM's Foreign Ministry 
reacted harshly when the Australian Government decided to 
recognize the "Macedonian community" living in Australia as 
"Slav-Macedonians," and when buildings belonging to the 
Macedonian Orthodox Church and the Macedonian community were 
targeted by "violent terrorist acts."181 Human rights 
organizations, such as "The Dignity Society" and "The 
Macedonian Movement for Balkan Prosperity," have also 
emphasized rights abuses by the Greek Government against 
"Macedonians" in Aegean Macedonia (Northern Greece).  The 
President of "The Dignity Society," Kole Mangov, said that 
his organization had documented 400 cases of "Greek 
authorities' discrimination against Macedonians," involving 
nonrecognition of a "Macedonian" identity, denying entry 
180
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into Greece of Greek citizens who claim they are 
"Macedonians," revoking citizenship, and confiscating 
property.182 
H.  PRIORITIES OF THE REVISIONIST POWER 
The revisionist power is likely to show increased 
sensitivity concerning the minority ethnic group and 
questions related to boundary rectification.  Weiner says 
that this issue, "rather than matters of internal 
development, receives the highest priority.... In foreign 
policy, the government searches for allies and arms; in 
domestic policy, it gives high priority to military 
expenditures. "183 
This is a difficult factor to analyze and judge, since 
FYROM is.in an early phase of state-building and 
institutional development.  In addition, FYROM must divert 
much of its political activity and security measures to 
perceived separatist movements by Albanian and Serb 
minorities within FYROM, and to perceived irredentist claims 
from Albania, Serbia, and Bulgaria.  Nonetheless, some 
evidence supports Weiner's hypothesis about the priorities 
of a revisionist power.  This evidence may have a direct 
182
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relationship with FYROM's alleged irredentist obsession with 
Greece. 
One such indication is provided by FYROM's priorities 
and procedures concerning defense allocations.  Although 
FYROM's parliament is formally responsible by its 
constitution for shaping the defense budget, it is unable to 
do so in practice because of its infrequent assembly.  This 
confers an enormous amount of control on the President and 
his cabinet concerning the approval of "cost overruns" and 
"supplementary allocations. "184 
Consequently, the defense budget has "more than doubled 
in the last few years, and attempts to curb presidential 
authority in defense and foreign policy have notably 
failed."185 Although prudence is understandable in light of 
the external threats perceived by FYROM's leadership, the 
centralization of Skopje's government may encourage the 
impression that this leadership is increasingly less 
accountable to the public.  Greek elites may interpret 
developments in FYROM in ways that support existing 
convictions about FYROM's allegedly revisionist intentions. 
This example of increased military expenditures and the 
inability of FYROM's parliament to safeguard against 




executive domination might be seen as supporting Weiner's 
proposition about a revisionist power's domestic priorities. 
Another interpretation might be based on the judgement that 
Skopje's leaders may believe that their state's survival is 
highly threatened, and that their motives may therefore be 
defensive rather than revisionist.  On the other hand, 
evidence of Skopje's budgetary priorities could be 
interpreted by some (notably, the Greeks) as a decision by 
FYROM's leaders to "put aside development programs in 
pursuit of their irredentist objectives."186 Weiner cites 
Alexander Gerschenkron's analysis of Bulgarian pre-World War 
I economic development policies as an example of this 
characteristic.187 Gerschenkron concluded that Bulgaria 
forfeited industrial development because of its 
preoccupation with expansion and its war preparations 
against Turkey.188 
While FYROM's defense budget is increasing and 
continues to do so without parliamentary accountability, • 
reports suggest that the economy is plummeting.  From 1993 
to 1994, retail prices have risen by 121.8% and the cost of 
186' Weiner,    "Macedonian  Syndrome,"  p.   675. 
187Alexander Gerschenkron,   Economic Backwardness  in 
Historical  Perspective   (Cambridge,   Mass.   1962),   p.   233. 
188Ibid. 
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living by 128.3%, while salaries have decreased by 9.7%.189 
In addition, there was a 5.6% decrease in employment,190 and 
a 1,200% increase in the trade deficit.191  In 1992 to 1993 
economic growth was down 37%, inflation was running at 
349.8%, and the national debt was $665 million.192 
These economic developments do not necessarily prove 
that FYROM is pursuing a domestic policy along the lines 
that Weiner posited as characteristic of the revisionist 
state.  However, the impressions that Greece may form from 
FYROM1s increased military expenditures, with relation to 
its poor economy, may be decisive.  Greece and FYROM appear 
to have become locked in a tighter "spiraling" relationship. 
The danger in this type of relationship is that it "stresses 
the prevalence of self-fulfilling prophecies."193 That is, 
what was initially a false interpretation of the situation 
actually becomes a true one. 
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FYROM's foreign policy has also given the Greeks cause 
for concern.  FYROM's relationship with Turkey has already 
been mentioned.  Other potential allies have been solicited 
by FYROM as well.  Members of the European Union have not 
only recognized FYROM but have also helped raise much needed 
economic and humanitarian assistance, which ultimately 
undermined Greece's position.194  FYROM is seeking associate 
membership in the European Union, and participation in 
NATO's Partnership for Peace.195  Finally, U.S. deployment of 
peacekeeping forces under United Nations auspices is 
interpreted by FYROM as UN and U.S. support for the 
independence of an independent "Macedonia."  FYROM's 
membership in prominent European and transatlantic 
organizations would undermine whatever leverage Greece has 
as the only Balkan country that is a member of both NATO and 
the European Union.  The significance of Greek influence 
within these organizations in Balkan matters would be 
diminished, and this is seen in Athens as a threat to 
Greece. 
The Greek response to FYROM's "search for allies" is 
evident in a poll conducted in June 1992, which asked 
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respondents to rank foreign policy concerns.  60.2 percent 
of those polled placed FYROM at the top, with Turkey and 
Cyprus coming in second with 28.7%.  When asked to identify 
the main security threat facing Greece, 68.3% placed Turkey 
at the top.  FYROM followed with 35.5%, and Albania was last 
with 4.1%.196 
Thus, the Greek reaction (as the status-quo power) to 
FYROM1s revisionist foreign policy appears to display the 
same type of "obsession" that Weiner suggests for the 
revisionist state.  A closer look at Greece reveals a long 
history of "obsession" with Turkey.  And with that 
"obsession" Greece has pursued the same foreign policy 
(allies and arms) and domestic policy (military expenditures 
above internal development) that Weiner describes as evident 
for the revisionist state.  Its approach to the Macedonian 
question is not a new foreign and domestic policy by Greece, 
but an old policy patterned on (and influenced by) its 
troubled relationship with Turkey.  It appears, then, that a 
policy of "obsession" is not reserved for only the 
revisionist power but may effect the status quo power as 
well. 
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I.  THE INTERNAL POWER STRUCTURE OF THE REVISIONIST POWER 
As the irredentist objectives become paramount in the 
revisionist state, Weiner says, "the internal power 
structure ...is likely to develop in such a way as to favor 
those advocating order and unity at home and militancy 
abroad."197  Dictatorial tendencies are likely to occur 
during this stage.  According to Weiner, there is a strong 
inclination by the central government to "resist genuinely 
free elections and a representative process that might 
change the existing power structure."198 
One example has already been discussed:  the 
centralized control that FYROM's President has over the 
defense budget.  Another closely related example proves how 
powerful.the President's position has become.  In 1993, 
President Gligorov fired General Mitre Arsovski, FYROM's 
first chief of staff, and replaced him with a naval officer, 
Admiral Bocinov. 
It appears that Arsovski's position as chief of staff 
gave him great control over military matters.  This may have 
threatened Gligorov's capacity to influence developments in 
his country.  Before replacing Arsovski, though, President 
Gligorov took steps to reduce the military's influence by 
197Weiner, "The Macedonian Syndrome," p. 676 
198ibid. 
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increasing the police forces and giving them duties once 
under the military's jurisdiction.  Observers in FYROM 
maintain that President Gligorov took these steps to 
strengthen his dominance and "personalize" FYROM's security 
forces.199  This possible consolidation of the internal power 
structure may be illustrated by the background of the person 
Gligorov appointed to replace Arsovski as the chief of 
staff—a- former Yugoslav naval officer, when FYROM—as a 
land-locked country—has no navy. 
The President also chooses the prime minister and the 
minister of defense, which both are currently members of 
Gligorov's political party.200 According to Isakovic and 
Danopoulos, other steps have been taken to strengthen 
President Gligorov's position: 
The general staff has been enlarged and is packed with 
officers personally loyal to the President.  Despite 
opposition from many quarters, Gligorov managed to pass 
a law transferring all property (apartments, bases and 
entertainment facilities) occupied by the JNA to the 
FYROM military.201 
The director of the Interior Ministry is also appointed by 
the President of the Republic and a member of his staff. 
Although the economy is plummeting and the national debt is 
199Isakovic and Danopoulos, "Civil-Military Relations," 
pp. 181-182. 
■ 200Ibid. 
201Ibid. p. 183. 
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increasing, the Interior Ministry, which handles state 
security and aspects of counter-intelligence, is 
expanding.202 
Evidence that the centralized government of President 
Gligorov is advocating internal "order and unity," while 
simultaneously resisting change to the established political 
composition, is mounting.  In 1991, the two main ethnic 
Albanian political parties, the Party for Democratic 
Prosperity (PDP) and the People's Democratic Party (NPD), 
boycotted a national census on the grounds of fraud.  The 
NPD claims that around 40% of the population is Albanian. 
Government figures are about half of what the Albanians 
claim.  The Serbian minority also expressed its disapproval 
of the 1991 census.  Instead of the official count of 40,000 
Serbs, the Democratic Party of Serbs (DPS) claims that there 
are between 200,000 and 300,000 Serbs in FYROM.203 
Another official census was conducted during the summer 
of 1994, with the same dissatisfaction and claims of 
government interference.  Allegations were made by the 
Serbian DPS party that the census was "unrealistic and 
invalid."  Others contended that the "census was staged, as 
202
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well as that tens of thousands of Serbs were not able to 
obtain citizenship certificates at the time of the 
census."204  The Albanian population apparently had similar 
difficulties.  At midpoint during the census, political 
leaders from the city of Diber confirmed that "no objective 
and real conditions have been created for the Albanians of 
this commune to participate in the census."205 
Accusations of fraud were made regarding the 1994 
national elections.  Most of the protests against the 
government's conduct during the elections were made by the 
leading opposition party, the Internal Macedonian 
Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian 
National Unity (VRMO-DPMNE), and by the Democratic Party 
(DP).  The DP President, Peter Gosev, called the election 
"state forgery," and announced that "objections" had been 
filed in 116 election stations across the country.206 Other 
statements by the DP characterized the elections' as a 
"silent coup d'etat" that had been rigged to "establish an 
204
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illegitimate and illegal power."207 
After the first round, the VMRO-DPMNE lodged its 
charges and decided to boycott the second round of 
elections.  The VMRO-DPMNE did so because it believed the 
government had deprived people of their right to vote in 
locations around the country that had been known for 
affiliations with political parties in opposition to the 
government.208  In its most striking attack, the VMRO-DPMNE 
accused the government of interfering in the private media. 
According to the VMRO-DPMNE, three TV stations in the town 
of St. Nikole had been banned and destroyed.  In addition, 
TV stations in Vinica and Stip had also been closed by 
government institutions.209 
Besides these patterns of government resistance to 
political competition that might threaten the established 
political structure, other signs confirming Weiner's 
hypotheses are surfacing.  Police intervention and arrests 
marked by "ethnic selectivity" are becoming conspicuously 
commonplace.  Much of the police and internal security 
207
"We Shall Continue Our Struggle for a Civil Society, " 
Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA, 24 Oct 94 (FBIS-EEU-94-204, 25 Oct 
94), p. 2. 
208
"Publication of Final Results," Skopje VECER, 27 Oct 
94 (FBIS-EEU-94-209, 28 Oct 94), p. 4. 
209
"VMRO-DPMNE Says Government Attacking Media, " Skopje 
MIC, 30 Sep 94 (FBIS-EEU-94-192, 4 Oct 94). 
118 
action has centered on the Albanian ethnic community, with 
government allegations that Albanian paramilitary 
organizations are forming.  The Albanian PDP party says that 
the increased police presence in Albanian-populated regions 
is unjustified, and only used by the government to pressure 
and intimidate the ethnic Albanians and to portray them as 
terrorists .210 
There is a great risk in the continued tendency of 
FYROM's government to resist a competitive political 
framework and to use police and security forces to arrest 
and intimidate "opponents" of the regime.  Weiner believes 
that this tendency lends itself to the military's takeover 
of political power, and lists Greece in 1909 and 1967 and 
Pakistan in 1965 as examples of this phenomenon.211 
Confirming this assessment of the risks in FYROM, Isakovic 
and Danopoulos state that: 
...the experience of widespread political violence 
propagates social patterns of behavior that encourage 
political domination by the military....FYROM does not 
have tight normative constraints on the political 
activities of the military, and it lacks its own 
traditional norms of civil-military relations.  The 
present political system is too personalistic and may 
not survive the eventual replacement of its founder, 
210
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President Gligorov.^-2 
J.  THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF THE REVISIONIST POWER 
While the revisionist state becomes increasingly 
centralized in controlling its people and institutions, its 
political culture becomes fashioned by a hyper-nationalist 
disposition.  According to Weiner, "national loyalties 
become paramount... There is a growing hostility to all 
countries and foreigners who do not support the 'just' 
demands of the nation, [and] hostility to internal dissent 
because it weakens national unity."213 
This characteristic is most apparent in the principles 
championed by the right-wing, "irredentist" political 
parties in FYROM.  During the first multiparty elections, 
the VMRO-DPMNE won 38 of the 120 seats in the assembly.  It 
acquired.the name "most Macedonian," and had as its purpose 
"the struggle for the restoration of the pride and 
worthiness of the Macedonian individual, the Macedonian 
people, and the Macedonian state."214  The VMRO-DPMNE had • 
proposed amendments to the constitution which would define 
the republic as a "state of the Macedonian people" and which 
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would abandon the listing of the minorities.215 
Besides the VMRO-DPMNE, the Movement for All-Macedonian 
Action (MAAK) is another "nationalist" political party.  On 
12 November 1990, it joined with the VMRO-DPMNE, the Peoples 
Party, and the Agrarian Party to form the "National Front." 
Its views regarding the ethnic Albanian question illustrate 
the growing hostility toward this ethnic group in FYROM. 
Concerning the Albanian question, the deputy chairman of 
MAAK, Levko Djambazovski, said that "the Macedonian people 
in their own state should restore the relationship between 
the state and the minority.  But the minority does not feel 
any attachment to the state; they only demand rights."216 
This is a growing sentiment of many "Macedonians" in 
FYROM.  They regard the Albanian minority as disloyal 
citizens who maintain a strategy of destabilizing the state. 
Examples cited of this strategy include: the boycotting of 
referenda and the census, not voting for the constitution, 
refusing military service, organizing paramilitary 
organizations, and attempting to propagate the Albanian 
culture through the opening of an Albanian-language 
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A "nationalist" backlash has resulted from this 
perceived Albanian strategy to weaken the state.  FYROM has 
expelled ethnic Albanian activists from Kosovo, has detained 
others, and has closed the border between Kosovo and 
FYROM.218  Over a six-month period in 1994, FYROM allegedly 
deported 660 illegal Albanians, and detained another 1,600 
Albanians, for the same purpose.219  In constitutional 
matters, no amendments permitting the use of the Albanian 
language have passed in FYROM's Assembly.220 Police 
searched, sealed off and destroyed part of a building that 
was presumed to be part of the Albanian University in 
Tetovo.  The police action included the arrest of the 
University President, and the confiscation of 114 documents 
of those who would be enrolled at the University.221 
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K.  RISKY DECISIONS BY THE REVISIONIST STATE 
According to Weiner's hypotheses, within the government 
and military, and among the people of the revisionist state, 
"there develops a willingness... to take chances in 
international affairs without any careful calculations as to 
the probability of a successful outcome."222 
As examples of bungled military operations by 
revisionist states, Weiner cites Bulgaria's attempt to 
absorb the Macedonian region in 1912, Greece's efforts to 
expand its territory into Asia Minor in 1922, Pakistan's 
attack on India in an effort to gain control over Kashmir in 
1965, and the Arab states' provocative actions, which led to 
Israel's preemptive strike and the Six-Day War in 1967. 
Weiner concludes that in all four instances, the political 
and military elites of the revisionist states overestimated 
their military capabilities and the support of their 
allies.223 
With regard to FYROM, the potential for a self- 
fulfilling prophecy to be realized is increasing.  FYROM's 
internal pressures (economy, secessionist movements), 
external pressures (irredentist claims), and dependency on 
foreign powers (Turkey, the United States) may lead some of 
222Weiner, "The Macedonian Syndrome," p. 677 
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FYROM's leaders to consider acts of aggression.  According 
to Robert Jervis, "states that seek security may believe 
that the best, if not the only, route to that goal is to 
attack and expand."  Jervis adds that the "drive for 
security will also produce aggressive actions if [the state] 
feels menaced by the very presence of other strong 
states."224 
Border skirmishes and encroachments on FYROM's northern 
and southern borders are becoming commonplace.  After an 
apparent incursion into a disputed region of FYROM's 
territory by the Yugoslav (Serbian) Army and Air Force, 
FYROM's minister of defense threatened the Serbs with 
"international factors" and with the use of force by the 
"Macedonian" Army.225  Testing FYROM's patience along its 
southern border, there have been reports of Greek warplanes 
flying across the border and using the excuse of 
"navigational errors" for their incursions.226 
Economic pressures have been used against FYROM in an 
uncalculated manner by Greece.  The economic embargo against 
FYROM in February 1994 and Greece's refusal to lift the 
224 Jervis, Perception and Misperception, pp. 63-64 
225
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226
"A Red Card Handed to the Serbs at the Vardar River 
Too," Split NEDJELJNA DALMACIJA, 29 Jun 94 (FBIS-EEU-94-130, 
2 9 Jun 94), p. 11. 
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blockade and open its borders have led the EU Commission to 
begin legal proceedings against Greece for violating EU 
rules.  Greece's argument for imposing the blockade is based 
on Article 224 of the Maastricht treaty.  This article 
stipulates that an embargo could be enacted without the 
prior consultation of the other EU members in the case of a 
"threat of war."227  This embargo was intended by Greece to 
force concessions out of FYROM regarding its name, flag, and 
constitution, but instead its policy has had a reverse 
effect.  FYROM has become more defiant and intransigent, 
though the embargo has hurt its economy, and Greece has 
become more isolated in the EU.228 
Furthermore, "Commando" or paramilitary groups appear 
to be organizing, with some independent operations already 
executed.  A militant-political wing of the VMRO-DPMNE in 
FYROM is now being compared with the Hitler "Jugend," 
Mussolini's "Black Shirts," Bulgarian "Brannik," or the 
Serbian "Sokoli."229 These self-professed "liberation 
fighters" adorn themselves in military camouflage uniforms 
227
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and red berets (bearing the yellow lion symbol of the VMRO- 
DPMNE), and are heavily armed.230 
There are also signs of similar paramilitary 
organizations in Greece.  So-called "superpatriots" have 
been blamed by the Greek Government for carrying out an 
independent commando operation in Albania.  It appears that 
the Front for the Liberation of Northern Ipiros (MAVT) 
conducted a raid into Albania, because of the Greek 
Government's inaction regarding the ethnic Greek minority in 
Albania.231 Other "commando" groups are reported to operate 
in the Greek province of Thrace.  This fact has incited 
appeals to the Greek government by Greek journalists to 
"investigate all the nationalistic paramilitary groups which 
are said to exist in border areas."232 
These frequent military skirmishes on FYROM's northern 
and southern border and the formation of paramilitary or 
commando units are, according to Weiner, overtures for 
expanded military operations. 
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L.  TERRORISM AND COERCION AGAINST THE IRREDENTIST 
GOVERNMENT BY THE IRREDENTISTS THEMSELVES 
According to Weiner, "there is a high probability that 
[an] armed minority will turn their, arms against their own 
government if in their judgment it fails to pursue a 
sufficiently aggressive expansionist policy."233 Weiner uses 
the example of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary 
Organization (IMRO) and its role in overthrowing Bulgarian 
governments during the 1920's and early 1930'S.  In 
explaining this characteristic, Weiner also uses the example 
of Lebanon and Jordan arming Palestinian Arabs.  Their 
policy backfired:  the Palestinians turned against these 
supportive governments with armed aggression when they felt 
restrained by Lebanon and Jordan.234 
The same Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization 
(now using the abbreviation VMRO-DPMNE), cited by Weiner as 
an example of this characteristic during the early twentieth 
century, is begining today to resemble its militant days of 
old.  It is currently acting in opposition to the government 
in FYROM, with open clashes between the militant wing of the 
VMRO-DPMNE and detachments of the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs.  Members of the VMRO-DPMNE are viewed as 
233Weiner, "Macedonian Syndrome," p. 678 
234Ibid., pp. 678-679. 
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"disrupters of the public order" and as "militants and 
destructive people."  Great concern is stirred by the 
figures the VMRO-DPMNE boasts of in its so-called "Youth 
Union."  Many in FYROM believe that some 15,000 youth 
members are being indoctrinated with nationalist propaganda 
by the party leadership of the VMRO-DPMNE.235 
There are many examples of the VMRO-DPMNE*s independent 
militant stance toward the government and the ethnic 
Albanian community in FYROM.  In 1992, two members of the 
VMRO's Defense Committee were arrested and charged with the 
attempt to blow up the party headquarters of PDP and NDP in 
Tetovo.  The VMRO-DPMNE distanced itself from the accused, 
and said that "it was an action at the wrong time and in the 
wrong place."236  In other developments, the VMRO-DPMNE's 
External Commission is accused of forming an "ethnic 
national guard" (MNG) composed of a 10,000-man army and 
special forces units in 1992.  Since the Army of the 
Republic of Macedonia (ARM) was formed at the same time, the 
MNG units were forced to disband.  This government action 
created a great deal of animosity, with calls by the VMRO- 
DPMNE for President Gligorov to resign.  However, there are 
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reports of "thousands of armed patriots" still in 
operation.2j7 
M.  REVISIONIST THREAT, POLITICAL CULTURE, AND ETHNIC 
HOMOGENEITY 
According to Weiner, 
The effects of irredentist claims on the internal 
political structure and on the political culture of the 
anti-irredentist political system depend very much on 
the magnitude of the threat from the revisionist state 
and on the degree of ethnic homogeneity in the anti- 
irredentist country.238 
As stated above, Greece views the importance of this 
perceived security threat by FYROM through the prism of the 
historical Turkish threat from the east.  Greek elites 
believe that Turkey is exploiting FYROM to open a second, 
strategic "front" with Greece.  To deter and counter the 
perceived efforts of the Turks to gain hegemony in the 
Balkans, Greece is undertaking "defensive security measures 
and a strategically designed diplomatic initiative."239 To 
illustrate the perceived magnitude of this threat, it should 
be recalled that the combined total percentage of those 
polled who considered Turkey and FYROM as the main threat 
237Ibid. 
238Weiner,   "The Macedonian Syndrome,"  p.   679. 
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against Greece was 93.5.24C 
Furthermore", in an interview, the Greek Prime Minister, 
Andreas Papandreou, reiterated Greek perceptions of a 
Turkish threat from the east.  Papandreou emphasized 
Greece's position that it would never concede or compromise 
its sovereign rights to have friendship with Turkey. 
According to Papandreou, 
The.problem from the north is associated with the 
problem from the east.  It is a difficult period that 
requires of us a strategy, definite self-restraint, and 
a firm stance on our rights.  We cannot go back even 
one step, because one step means two, ten, and finally, 
it means a decisive contraction of Hellenism.  We will 
not allow this to happen.241 
N.  OBSESSION WITH THE PAST 
According to Weiner's next characteristic, the 
irredentist state, the status-quo state, and the shared 
ethnic group are all likely to have "a great concern, almost 
an obsession, with the past, as each actor seeks to define 
or justify its identity."242  This obsession with the past 
specifically involves the parameters of historic kingdoms, 
historic heroes, and the culture of distinct people.  Since 
240
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these historical and cultural components create a linkage 
with the identity and heritage of a people, they are often 
glorified and deeply respected.  Weiner says, "individuals 
will react with extraordinary vehemence to what to an 
outsider would appear to be trivial historical points."243 
In the Balkans, this "obsession" with the past often 
accompanies a strong hyper-nationalist tendency, and usually 
one display leads to another.  Here is where the conflict 
begins with Greece and FYROM.  Greece believes that the 
usable past claimed by FYROM is a usurpation of its own 
classical past.  Again, this creates fear among the Greeks 
that "Macedonian nationalism might spread through the 
efforts of irredentists who persist in claiming that Greek 
Macedonia is a Slav Macedonian land."244  In essence, Greeks 
point to a period in Yugoslav Macedonian history when, they 
believe, a political manipulation occurred for the purpose 
of transforming a population into ethnic "Macedonians." 
Tito is accused by the Greeks of developing the 
framework of a "Macedonian" state, of transforming the local 
spoken language into the "Macedonian" language, of 
establishing a new Church, of reinterpreting the historical 
past, and finally, of providing the local people with a 
243Ibid., p. 681 
244Perry,   "Macedonia:  A Balkan Problem,"  p.   39. 
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mission to unify all "Macedonians" in the region. 
Confirming this interpretation of Tito's intentions, CM. 
Woodhouse says that "after 1945 Tito began openly talking of 
a Greater Macedonia which would include not only his minute, 
artificial province but also the major Greek province which 
he called Aegean Macedonia."245 
The Greeks have responded in dramatic fashion to the 
events related above.  Major demonstrations with more than a 
million participants have occurred in the streets of Athens 
and in the northern city of Thessaloniki.  The airports in 
Kavala and Thessaloniki have been renamed respectively 
"Alexander the Great" and "Macedonian."  Scores of 
publications describing the Greek view are being distributed 
by the Greek Ministry for Press and Information.  Powerful 
Greek-American organizations in Washington have lobbied 
prominent Members of Congress and even the President himself 
on this issue.  The conservative Greek government of the New 
Democracy lost its majority in parliament because of the 
Macedonian question, when right-wing members of the New 
Democracy party departed and began a new political party in 
1993.246 
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Besides objecting to FYROM's use of these symbols, the 
Greeks argue that FYROM has no historical, ethnic, or 
cultural right to use the word "Macedonia" as part of its 
name.  Greece maintains and elaborates a complex argument in 
this regard.  For instance, Greece holds that the word 
"Macedonia" is Greek.  The Greeks claim that the Macedonians 
descended from the royal family of Argos (from central 
Peloponnisos) and the Argeian King Temenos and his ancestor, 
Heracles.247 And from this lineage, Alexander I, Philip II, 
and Alexander the Great can be traced many generations 
later.  Proof of this, the Greeks claim, is found in several 
sources: 
- In the enormous palace of the Macedonian kings that 
was uncovered in the area of Vergina (Aegea), one find 
mentions 'To the head of the race, Heracles.' 
- Isocrates in his speech addressed to Philip II, in 
which he urges the Macedonian king to accept for the 
sake of all the Greeks the post of Commander-in-Chief 
in the war against the Persians, says that , '...the 
Thebans honor the chief of your race Heracles.' 
- Also in the royal tombs of Vergina, the shield of 
Philip II was found on which the club of Heracles is 
pictured as emblem. .» 
- The coins of Macedonia bore the figure of Heracles. 
- On the origin of the royal house of Macedon and its 
descent from the Temenids of Argos, the opinions of 
most historians and men of letters of the times, such 
163, 25 Aug 93), p. 4. 
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as Herodotus, Thucydides, Isocrates, generally 
coincide.248 
Besides the genealogy and descent of the Macedonian 
Kings, the Greeks claim that there were Macedonians who won 
events in the Olympic games.  Olympic games during this era 
were'exclusive, and only Greeks were allowed to take part. 
The ancient historians, Pausanias and Herodotus, confirm 
this in their writings about Macedonians who won events from 
as early as 496 B.C. until 268 B.C.249 
Another source the Greeks point to is a religious 
one.250 The Old Testament figure Daniel made an amazing 
prediction about 200 years before the rise of Alexander the 
Great.  In this prophecy, found in the book of Daniel 8: 1- 
22, Daniel predicts that: 
The ram which you saw with the two horns, these are the 
kings of Media and Persia.  And the he-goat is the king 
of Greece; and the great horn between his eyes is the 
first king.  As for the horn that was broken, in place 
of which four others arose, four kingdoms shall arise 
from his nation, but not with his power.251 
According to some observers, this prophecy was 
fulfilled in 331 B.C. when the king of Greece, Alexander the 
Great, defeated Darius, the king of Media and Persia, at the 
248Nicolaos K. Martis, Falsification of Macedonian 
History, (Athens: Athanassiades Bros., 1983), pp. 22-23 
249Ibid., pp. 29-30.- 
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Battle of Arbela.  Describing the last part of the prophecy 
and the succession of Alexander the Great, J.F.C. Fuller 
wrote that "the empire he (Alexander) founded split into 
factions, four great monarchies arising in its stead — 
Egypt under the Ptolomies, Asia under the Seleucids, 
Macedonia under the Antigonids, and in India the empire of 
Chandragupts. "252 
On the other hand, FYROM has also expressed its views 
to justify its identity.  Like the Greek Prime Minister, 
FYROM's President Gligorov opposes a retreat or 
"concessions" concerning its constitutional right to bear 
the name "Macedonia."253 Approximately seventy five percent 
of those polled agree with the President, and are against 
changing the name "Macedonia."254  In a speech at the Academy 
Session of the Macedonian Assembly, President Gligorov 
emphasized that the foundations of a modern European nation, 
such as FYROM, are based on its distinct language and 
alphabet, on its long history throughout the centuries, and 
252J.F.C. Fuller, A Military History of the Western 
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on the "authentic characteristics" of its nation.253 
The danger of being locked in this uncompromising 
relationship is expressed by Stephen Van Evera: 
Relations are worst if images diverge in self- 
justifying directions.  This occurs if nations embrace 
self-justifying historical myths, or adopt distorted 
pictures of their own and others' current conduct and 
character that exaggerate the legitimacy of their own 
cause.  Such myths and distortions can expand a 
nation's sense of its right and its need to oppress its 
minorities or conquer its diaspora.255 
Because Greece and FYROM diverge in such an extreme manner, 
the likelihood of their nationalist sentiments advancing 
from a "purely self-liberation enterprise into a 
hegemonistic enterprise"' increases dramatically.257 
O.  FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION BY POLITICAL LEADERS AND THE MEDIA 
Weiner says that those "advocating a position contrary 
to the majority view are likely to be considered 
disloyal."258  The effect of this policy has already been 
discussed above, with examples of the government in FYROM 
attacking the private media that offered views differing 
255
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from the government.259  In addition, the Constitutional 
Court in FYROM has been used to stifle efforts by ethnic 
Albanian political parties, such as the NPD.260 
According to the Human Rights Watch/Helsinki report, 
Greek laws have been used to prosecute "political 
dissenters."  Until the new Greek government repealed 
certain articles of the Penal Code in 1993, those citizens 
who candidly indicated that they were "Macedonian" or stated 
that a "Macedonian" ethnic minority existed in Greece were 
prosecuted by the Greek authorities.  But, since the new law 
took effect, previous charges have been dropped, with the 
Human Rights Watch/Helsinki reporting that no one is serving 
a prison sentence because of political expression or 
dissent .261 
P.  TERMINATION OF THE DISPUTE 
Finally, Weiner proposes three typical solutions to the 
dispute.  One possibility requires a military victory by the 
irredentist power.  If a military takeover occurs by the 
irredentist state, then the roles may be reversed, and the 
259For detail information, see "VMRO-DPMNE Says 
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defeated state may make an irredentist claim to recapture 
its lost territory.  A second possibility involves the 
removal of the minority ethnic group from the disputed 
territory.  This removal could be accomplished in many ways- 
-through genocide, through an internally forced dispersion 
within the status-quo state, or through the expulsion of the 
minority group.  A third possibility entails a credible 
threat by one or more dominant countries who are willing to 
exercise their power and prestige to impose a settlement— 
by military means, if necessary.262 
Weiner asserts that it is difficult to predict which of 
the three methods or possibilities will end the dispute. 
But he emphasizes that the "least likely way in which the 
dispute can end is through voluntary agreement on the part 
of the disputing parties... and without the active 
involvement of third parties prepared to exercise their 
power to enforce a settlement."263 
Weiner cites the post-World War II era as an example in 
the Balkans.  He says that peace in the region stemmed from 
the Soviet Union's dominance throughout much of the Balkans 
during this time, and its capability to use force if 
necessary.  This willingness to use force by the Soviet 
262Weiner, "The Macedonian Syndrome," pp. 681-682 
263Ibid., p. 682. 
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Union, or more importantly, the perception that the Soviets 
were willing to use force, Weiner argues, is what prevented 
the Balkan states from moving toward military confrontation 
over irredentist claims.  This hypothesis is contrary to any 
of the "rational" solutions suggested by others—such as 
plebiscites, the peaceful exchanges of minorities, or a 
federation of Balkan states.264 
According to Weiner, 
It was only in the postwar era, when the Soviet Union 
emerged as the dominant power in the Balkans, willing 
to intervene to prevent one or another Balkan state 
from using force to assert its border claims—and 
militarily capable of such intervention—that peace was 
established in the region.265 
This hypothesis appears to have some basis in fact since 
Yugoslavia, although supposedly nonaligned during the Cold- 
War, did not fall apart and erupt into conflict when its 
long time leader and dictator, Josef Broz Tito, died in 
1980. 
It was not until the Berlin Wall had crumbled in 1989 
and the former Soviet Union began splitting apart in 1991 
that Yugoslavia and other Balkan countries began once more 
to distinguish themselves through their ethnic antagonisms 
and historic disputes. The external context also affected 




Their security from attack by the Soviet Union was enhanced 
by their entry into NATO in 1952.  Even their historic 
antagonisms were dampened by the East-West stalemate that 
characterized the Cold War.  Thus, both superpowers were 
instrumental in imposing a quasi-peace in the region, by 
which war was prevented for approximately forty-two years. 
(The main exception qualifying this observation was the 
Greek-Turkish War over Cyprus in 1974.) 
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V.   IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY 
Assessing the Macedonian question and the difficulties 
regarding a settlement of this dispute, Charles Homer 
Haskins and Robert Howard Lord concluded that: 
The Macedonian question has been before the world a 
sufficiently long time to have thoroughly wearied most 
people of it, perhaps, but not long enough to produce a 
clear understanding or any real unanimity of opinion 
about it.  It presents, on the one hand, such a medley 
of jarring races, long-standing animosities, and ever- 
recurring atrocities, and, on the other hand, such a 
jumble of ethnographic riddles, philological 
controversies, psychological uncertainties, unreliable 
statistics, assertions and counter-assertions flatly 
contradictory on every point, that one almost despairs 
of an idea as to how it ought to be settled, or of the 
hope of ever seeing it settled at all.266 
This gloomy assessment accurately portrays the current 
situation in the Macedonian region.  Yet it illustrates the 
continuity regarding the complexities of this dispute, 
because it was written after the Paris Peace Conference in 
1920. 
The question still remains as it did in 1920:  what are 
the prospects for a peaceful solution to this long-lasting 
dispute in the Macedonian region? Weiner's analysis offers 
a good starting point in answering these questions.  The 
only viable possibility for a peaceful settlement between 
Greece and FYROM is one in which a third party or coalition 
266Charles Homer Haskins and Robert Howard Lord, Some 
Problems of the Peace Conference (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1920), pp. 267-268. 
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would use its power to promote and enforce a settlement. 
It is unrealistic to believe that FYROM alone could 
militarily defeat Greece and occupy Greece's northern 
province of Macedonia.  Even though Greece may perceive 
FYROM's intent as being hostile, FYROM lacks the warfighting 
potential as measured by troop strength and armaments (such 
as tanks, artillery, and planes) to conduct a successful 
conventional military operation against Greece. 
Unconventional warfare is a more dangerous threat to Greek 
security at this point.  Nikoloas Zahariadis makes the 
assessment that the early stages of a low-intensity conflict 
between Greece and FYROM have already materialized, and 
cites examples of psychological warfare and prospects for an 
insurgency.267 
Another possible strategy for FYROM's expansion, 
Zahariadis writes, "is to divert international attention to 
disputes among its [FYROM's] more powerful neighbors in the 
hope of finding surrogate fighting powers."268 This scenario 
would involve great risks to the combatants, because they 
might be politically, economically, or even militarily 
isolated by the rest of Europe, NATO or the United Nations. 
267Nikolaos Zahariadis, "Is the Former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia a Security Threat to Greece?" Mediterranean 
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And it is equally unrealistic, at this juncture, to believe 
that Greece would recognize a separate ethnic "Macedonian" 
minority living within its borders.  This recognition would 
have to occur before any type of population transfer could 
take place. 
A.  THE "CRITICAL MARGIN" 
Therefore, with Weiner's third solution in mind, the 
only "Great Power" that has the qualifications and at the 
same time would not be perceived as a historical hegemon in 
the region is the United States.  Other "Great Powers" that 
may be returning to reclaim their influence are discredited 
in Balkan eyes because of the political "baggage" they bring 
from their past exploits in the region.  International and 
regional .organizations such as the U.N. and NATO are 
currently too fractured regarding Balkan issues, and have 
proven ineffective in solving the conflict raging in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina. 
According to Walt W. Rostow, the U.S. plays the role of 
the "critical margin" in international affairs.  Rostow says 
that "at the margin, the quiet, purposeful presence of the 
United States is required to sustain the balance of power" 
throughout the world.  In Rostow's view, the United States 
"cannot impose its will on others as a hegemonic power, but 
big things can't get done in the world without our active 
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participation."269    And  according  to   Josef  Joffe, 
It is Washington that orchestrates the Middle East 
peace process.  America, not Germany or Japan, leads 
the drive against the spread of the Bomb, coaxes North 
Korea and confronts'Iraq.... There are more power 
centers now than during the cold war.  But the U.S. 
still sits on top of the heap.270 
As the "critical margin," the United States has the 
opportunity to play a major active role in the solution to 
this dispute.  This dispute has the potential to involve 
several states in an expanded, full-scale Balkan war, which 
would differ  from the two Balkan Wars of the early 
twentieth century.  Most notably, the chances for containing 
the conflict are now diminished because of the modernization 
of the armed forces of Balkan states such as Serbia, 
Bulgaria, Turkey, and Greece—above all, the lethality, 
range, and quantity of their weaponry.  A military conflict 
over the Macedonian question would in all likelihood incite 
a clash between Greece and Turkey, and would probably be 
conducted with the most violent means available. 
The challenge for United States in this regional 
dispute will be to balance its national security strategy of 
engagement and enlargement with its post-Cold War domestic 
269Walt W. Rostow, "Regionalism in a Global System," in 
From Globalism to Regionalism, ed. Patrick M. Cronin 
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political constraints.  Internally, U.S. foreign policy is 
constrained by the very nature of a democracy, which usually 
undertakes military action only on a last resort basis. 
Operation Desert Storm is a good example of this phenomenon. 
There were passionate calls by some in the United States and 
overseas for a solution through diplomatic and economic 
pressure, even after a clear violation by Iraq of Kuwait's 
internationally recognized borders. 
Furthermore, with the continued pressures to balance 
the budget, the United States government will find it 
difficult to build the public support it needs to intervene 
in regions not vital to U.S. interests.  This economic 
constraint will also have an effect on the availability of 
U.S. forces and the time it will take to deploy them to the 
area of conflict, since U.S. forces that were "forward 
deployed" during the Cold-War era are decreasing in size and 
capability.271 
Washington's post-Cold War foreign policy struggle has 
been illustrated in the northern Balkans.  Without clearly 
established interests in the northern Balkans, the United 
States has been reluctant to commit itself to establish 
271For a detailed explanation of U.S. constraints in the 
post-Cold War era, see John J. Arquilla's forthcoming 
article, "Bound to Fail?  Regional Deterrence After the Cold 
War," Comparative Strategy, Vol. 14, no. 2, 1995. 
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peace in Bosnia.  According to Misha Glenny, 
The Bosnian government in Sarajevo feels betrayed 
because Washington's rhetoric in favor of a unified 
Bosnia was never backed by force.  One should either 
wage war on behalf of the Bosnian government or clearly 
state that one has no intention of doing so. 
Washington's great mistake was that it did neither:  it 
held out the prospect of intervention if the Bosnian 
government's position continued to deteriorate, then 
did nothing when it came to the crunch.272 
On the other hand, it appears that the United States 
has taken a different approach in the southern Balkans.  The 
United States has made commitments that seem to represent 
distinctly defined security interests in this strategically 
important region.  United States Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher publicly declared U.S. resolve to prevent the 
Bosnian conflict from spilling into FYROM and opening a 
"southern front."  Furthermore, the U.S. State Department 
has dispatched three envoys to the region in an effort to 
improve relations between Greece and Albania, Greece and 
FYROM, and Greece and Turkey.  The U.S. Defense Department 
has deployed.troops in FYROM along its border with Serbia, 
and has reportedly deployed intelligence assets in northern 
Albania to monitor events in Bosnia and Serbia.273 
272Misha Glenny, "Heading Off War in the Southern 
Balkans," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 3, May/June 1995, p. 
100. 
273Ibid., p. 107. 
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According to Misha Glenny, the United States is 
interested in the southern Balkans because of its concern 
with the threat to its lines of communication with the 
Middle East via the Aegean Sea and Turkey.  In other words, 
this increased interest on the part of the United States is 
due to the strategic importance it places on the southern 
Balkans and the Aegean Sea.  The geostrategic importance of 
the Macedonian region includes the north-south routes 
leading into the Aegean, and the east-west route linking the 
port of Dürres on the Adriatic to Istanbul in Turkey.  In 
addition, the United States is concerned about the increased 
potential for a war involving Greece, Turkey, Serbia, 
Bulgaria, FYROM, and Albania:  the rise in ethnic conflict 
within FYROM; and Turkey's changing domestic politics, 
including the success of the Islamic Welfare Party in its 
two most populous cities (Istanbul and Ankara) .274 
A negligence on the part of the United States to 
"balance its commitments and capabilities" regarding 
regional security in the southern Balkans may induce a state 
of "insolvency, a condition that encourages aggressors." 
This condition characterized U.S. foreign policy from 
Spanish-American War until entry into World War II.275 To 
274Ibid., pp. 103-106. 
275Ibid. 
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counter its isolationist tendencies, its temptation to defer 
to a multilateral collective security organization such as 
the United Nations, and its tendency to undertake only 
reactive measures, the United States ought to implement its 
national security strategy of engagement and enlargement 
with a southern Balkan foreign policy similar to the "Truman 
Doctrine" and the "Marshall Plan." 
On March 12, 1947, President Harry S. Truman announced 
that it would be "the policy of the United States to support 
free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by 
armed minorities or by outside pressures."276 This 
declaration—which became known as the "Truman Doctrine"— 
prepared the way for the United States to take on the 
traditional British role of blocking the Russian advance 
toward the warm water ports of the Mediterranean.  As a 
result, President Truman requested that security assistance 
amounting to $400 million be granted to Greece and Turkey. 
The "Marshall Plan" for economic aid to Europe was 
announced as a companion to the "Truman Doctrine" in June 
1947.  In a commencement address at Harvard on June 5, 1947, 
Secretary of State George C. Marshall announced the European 
276Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 
Harry S. Truman, 1947 vol. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 178, cited in Henry 
Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p. 
453. 
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Recovery Program, which provided $12 billion in 
reconstruction assistance to European states.  This was only 
a small fraction of the total investment, since European 
recipients contributed nearly eight times that amount. 
However, it was not just the financial amount that made 
an impact on European stability, but also the institutional 
linkage it brought to the countries that participated. 
Institutions linking countries and promoting cooperation 
like the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European 
Payments Union (EPU) were established.  According to Jack 
Snyder, the Marshall Plan "had a multiplier effect on 
economic efficiency, while politically it strengthened 
internationally-oriented sectors and coalitions against 
their insular, protectionist competitors."277 
A southern Balkan foreign policy based on security 
measures characterized by the "Truman Doctrine" and by 
economic recovery and interdependence that was characterized 
by the "Marshall Plan" in post-World War II Europe, might 
provide preventive measures necessary for a peaceful 
solution instead of reactive measures that merely "put out 
277Jack Snyder, "Averting Anarchy in the New Europe, " in 
The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace, eds. Sean M. 
Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
1994), p. 130. 
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fires."  The danger of continuing with a reactive foreign 
policy in the southern Balkans is that the potential for a 
spark to quickly get out of control is currently present in 
FYROM.  The conflict in Bosnia illustrates not only how 
quickly war can erupt in a multiethnic state, but how 
difficult it is to control the conflict once it begins. 
These foreign policy measures based on engagement and 
enlargement would subdue obstacles that typically hinder 
deterrence and the peaceful settlement of disputes.  First, 
an engagement and enlargement strategy in the Balkans could 
provide an example of U.S.-led "collective enforcement" 
action, as in the Gulf War.  The fractured response in the 
prolonged war in Bosnia demonstrates that the Security 
Council of the United Nations is "an entity to be led, not 
to lead," and that the concept of multilateralism "depends 
upon, and starts with, unilateralism."278  In fact, Inis L. 
Claude defines multilateralism simply as "unilateralism 
plus."279 
Secondly, a U.S.-led engagement and enlargement 
strategy in the southern Balkans could prevent an 
incremental response or a tendency toward the "gradualism" 
2
"
8Inis L. Claude, "Collective Security After the Cold 
War," Third Annual Strategy Conference, Strategic Studies 
Institute, February 1992, pp. 17-18. 
279Ibid., p. 18. 
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that typically plagues democracies.  It wou Id also 
demonstrate U.S. commitment and resolve, wh ich arguably 
would be necessary to " counter the zealotry endemic to 
burgeonin g nationalist, revival ist and synd. Lcalist mass 
movements ."28° Examples of U • S. resolve and its deterrent 
effect in the post-Cold War era include Arne] cica's 
willingness to deploy f orces early in the Gulf War during 
Operation Desert Shield and the deployment of U.S. 
peacekeep ers in FYROM a long the border with the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) . Both actions arguably 
prevented aggression by a potentially hostile state. 
The United States should not have to pursue this policy 
of engagement and enlargement in the Balkans unilaterally. 
It should merely provide the "critical margin" necessary for 
its success.  That means the United States could take the 
lead through organizations such as NATO and encourage 
greater involvement by the EU, which certainly has 
legitimate interests in the Balkan region, and which could 
help the United States bear the costs and risks.  John J. 
Arquilla suggests that some form of "security insurance" 
could be paid to the United States to offset its expenses 
while deterring regional aggression during peacetime.  This 
280See John J. Arquilla's forthcoming article, "Bound to 
Fail?" p. 21. 
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"regional security insurance," Arquilla argues, would 
encourage the "solvency of U.S. foreign policy" by balancing 
its costs and benefits.281 
B.  THE ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY:  A BALKAN "TRUMAN DOCTRINE" 
The "Truman Doctrine" was a radical change in U.S. 
foreign policy that reversed a trend of "isolationalism" and 
initiated one that was "interventionalist" or "globalist" in 
nature.  This commitment took the form of a containment 
strategy in the Cold War struggle of ideology, which applied 
selective "counterforce to restrain Soviet expansionist 
moves."282 A preeminent objective of this selective 
engagement strategy was to guarantee the security of states 
that had grasped a democratic ideal but that were now 
threatened with being engulfed into the Soviet orbit.  This 
commitment, given by President Truman in a speech to the 
House and Senate on March 12, 1947, was presented to 
"political conservatives—who, after the congressional 
elections of 1946, comprised a majority of the legislature— 
were interested above all in reducing taxes and the level of 
governmental spending."283 
281 Ibid., p. 23 
282Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., The Doctrines of American 
Foreign Policy (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press, 1982), p. 113. 
283Ibid., p. 124. 
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The same political courage and foresight needed in 1947 
to implement this selective counterforce strategy is 
necessary as an identical .situation, described above, 
confronts and constrains the U.S. Congress today.  That is, 
political conservatives in the Congress—for instance, 
Republicans in the House of -Representatives who signed a 
"Contract with America"—have argued for reducing taxes and 
government spending.  The international situation clearly 
differs, in that the United States no longer faces a 
superpower that is ideologically hostile and that is leading 
an expansionist movement that must be "contained." 
A Trumanesque foreign policy strategy regarding the 
Macedonian question would contain the anarchic effects of 
hyper-nationalism and irredentism.  And like the "Truman 
Doctrine" of old, a pillar of this new engagement strategy 
in the southern Balkans would be to guarantee the security 
of states that have embraced the democratic ideal and that 
are threatened by the effects of hyper-nationalism and 
irredentism in a Hobbesian world. 
The justification for such a policy in the southern 
Balkans could be derived from the U.S. (and Western) 
interest in keeping the lines of communication open to the 
Middle East.  This is especially important since the United 
States and its Western allies view the security of the 
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Middle East/Persian Gulf region (and the uninterrupted flow 
of oil) as a vital interest.  Also, some might argue, this 
strategic region could serve as a buffer area to protect 
Europe from Islamic fundamentalism. 
The first step in this engagement policy would be for 
the United States and its Western partners to provide 
unambiguous, specific security guarantees to both Greece and 
FYROM.  These defensive security guarantees would only be 
triggered if an individual state was attacked,' and not if 
that state committed aggression in any manner.  Furthermore, 
these security guarantees should preferably come in the form 
of treaties ratified by the U.S. Senate and the legislatures 
of the other NATO governments.  If the legislative branch in 
the United States is not persuaded to support this measure, 
then an executive agreement by the President would serve as 
a strong enough initiative and warning to deter possible 
aggressors .284 
FYROM's elites may consider Greece a threat to FYROM's 
national security; but in actuality, Serbia, Bulgaria, and 
Albania are more plausible threats than is Greece.  One 
specific measure that would strengthen FYROM's security 
would be to continue the U.N. deployment of troops along its 
284For a broader summary of political initiatives, see 
John J. Arquilla's forthcoming article, "Bound to Fail," pp. 
21-22. 
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border with Serbia.  This would give legitimacy to FYROM's 
government.  Moreover, with U.S. soldiers participating 
prominently in the mission, it would- also represent U.S. 
resolve in guaranteeing FYROM's national integrity. 
Another form of deterrence could include a contingency 
plan that would expand the deployment of U.N. peacekeepers 
to other points along FYROM's borders.  The single most 
important factor in this measure and the others would be to 
strengthen FYROM because of the historic "vacuum" propensity 
and the temptation that this brings its neighbors when the 
strategically situated Macedonian region (or any of its 
parts) is vulnerable.  Arms transfers and military training 
from the West could also strengthen FYROM and contribute to 
an equilibrium in the region, but such measures would have 
to be implemented in a manner that would not threaten the 
security of FYROM's neighbors or add to the ambiguous inputs 
that might well stimulate a "spiraling" relationship of 
mutual mistrust.  A principle that should be considered when 
assessing military posturing in the region is that a state 
with an irredentist claim should not be militarily superior, 
especially in offensive capability, in relation to its 
neighbors.285 This may be a difficult principle to enforce, 
but all means available should be used to thwart the 
285Snyder, "Averting Anarchy," p. 132. 
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temptations that may arise when the combination of offensive 
capabilities and irredentist claims is present. 
In addition to measures stemming from security 
guarantees and assistance, steps should be taken to defuse 
"spiraling" tensions between Greece and FYROM.  The lack of 
a "sovereign" in regional and international politics and the 
"consequences of living in a Hobbesian state of nature," in 
Robert Jervis's view, exacerbate a "spiraling" relationship 
and enable wars to occur.286  If the United States was 
committed to this role as "sovereign," however, the United 
States might be able to persuade Greece and FYROM that they 
are locked in a "spiraling" relationship that is counter to 
their interests. 
One method to achieve this initial reconciliation would 
be to encourage initiatives to be taken by both sides 
simultaneously that would increase the other's security. 
According to Jervis, these simultaneous initiatives would 
warm relations between the two states locked in a 
"spiraling" relationship.  The reason, he explains, is that 
such initiatives might reduce the offensive capabilities 
states possess, and might also furnish proof of a state's 
nonviolent intentions.287 
286Jervis, Perception and Misperception, pp. 62-63, 
287Ibid., p. 82. 
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One initiative along these lines could come in the form 
of a  conventional forces agreement between Greece, 
Bulgaria, and Turkey.  The negotiations for such an 
agreement could be sponsored and coordinated by the United 
States and other security partners.  This agreement might 
defuse tensions by reducing offensive capabilities and 
forces that are built up along the borders in Thrace.  A 
gradual reduction in forces in this sensitive area could 
eventually lead to the establishment of a buffer zone that 
would emphasize effective defensive measures.  According to 
Jervis, "when the defense has the advantage over the 
offense, a large increase in one state's security only 
slightly decreases the security of the others, and status- 
quo powers can all enjoy a high level of security and 
largely escape from the state of nature."288 
A related measure would be for the United States and 
its Western allies to phase out the security assistance they 
provide in the form of weapons transfers, loans, grants, and 
equipment sales to Greece and Turkey.  This policy of 
security assistance, which has continued since the end of 
the Cold War, might have played a significant role in 
288Robert Jervis, "Offense, Defense, and the Security 
Dilemma," in International Politics: Enduring Concepts and 
Contemporary Issues, eds. Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis 
(New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1992)p. 146. 
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creating an arms race between Greece and Turkey and, 
according to the "spiral model," is "most apt to heighten 
tensions and create illusory incompatibility."289 
These policy measures would have an important effect on 
Greece's relationship' with FYROM, since a Greek-Turkish 
detente and the lessening of insecurities would naturally 
spill over into relations with FYROM.  A detente between 
Greece and Turkey and a decrease in their defense budgets 
(perhaps coupled with modifications in Western security 
assistance) would help both countries to concentrate on 
economic recovery and growth.  Except for France, Greece and 
Turkey are the only two countries in NATO that have 
increased their defense budgets since the end of the Cold 
War, while their national debt continues to increase and 
their economies have stagnated.  For instance, Greece 
currently has a national public debt of more than 110 per 
cent of its gross domestic product.290 
Robert Jervis also argues that "a willingness to fight 
for issues of low intrinsic value [and the] avoidance of any 
appearances of weakness" are types of behavior that heighten 
"spiraling" tensions.291  From this perspective, Greece and 
289Jervis, Perceptions and Misperceptions, p. 84 
290Kerin Hope, "Walking the Economic Tightrope," 
Financial Times, November 14, 1994, p. 2 
291Ibid. 
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FYROM should be persuaded by the United States and its 
Western allies to not allow the complexities of competitive 
nationalism to prevent them from exploiting the lucrative 
opportunities they now possess in the Balkan region.  To 
become shortsighted at this juncture would jeopardize an 
occasion for both to have a regional impact in terms of 
economic expansion and political, military, and religious 
cooperation. 
Greece and FYROM must also be persuaded to not carry 
out their foreign policies with a diplomatic effort darkened 
by a "crusading spirit."  For, as Hans J. Morgenthau wrote, 
"a diplomacy that thinks in legalistic and propagandistic 
terms is particularly tempted to insist upon the letter of 
the law, as it interprets the law, and to lose sight of the 
consequences such insistence may have for its own nation and 
for humanity."292 
Instead, Greece and FYROM must be willing to compromise 
on issues that are not vital to their national interests." 
The word "Macedonia," the Sun of Vergina, maps of a greater 
Macedonian state including part of northern Greece, currency 
displaying the Greek city of Thessaloniki, and a 
constitution implying aspirations to a greater Macedonia are 
292Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1978), p. 555. 
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all—understandably—seen as provocations by Greece. 
However, they are no more than provocations, and they 
do not tangibly threaten the integrity of Greece's national 
territory and institutions.  FYROM should recognize how the 
name and symbols that it chooses for its state are perceived 
by the Greeks, and should initiate concrete, unambiguous 
measures to define alternatives or compromises.  On the 
other hand, the focus of Greek diplomacy should be on the 
nation's present, confirmed, national security, and not on a 
speculative scenario for the future.  A prudent government 
should be keenly aware of any future danger on the horizon, 
but should first secure support from its principal allies. 
A government can only accomplish this task if it reacts to 
the behavior of provocateurs with restraint, and avoids a 
"crusading spirit." 
Here is where compromise plays a crucial role.  Edmund 
Burke, commenting on the significance of compromise in 
political affairs, says that "all government, indeed every 
human benefit and enjoyment, every virtue and every prudent 
act, is founded on compromise and barter.  We balance 
inconveniences; we give and take; we remit some rights, that 
we may enjoy others; and we choose rather to be happy 
citizens than subtle disputants."293 A nation and its 
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people, therefore, who consider their foreign affairs in 
legalistic terms, who insist on their own rights according 
to their own view, and who are unwilling to compromise for 
the sake of peaceful relations, place themselves in danger 
and choose to be "subtle disputants" rather than "happy 
citizens." 
An initial step toward reconciliation could take the 
form of Greece lifting its economic blockade and recognizing 
FYROM, while some compromise regarding FYROM's name and 
symbols is defined.  For example, a name change could denote 
a geographic definition, such as adding "Vardar" or "Upper" 
to the name "Macedonia," or it could involve adding "New" to 
the name.  Another compromise could be for FYROM to be 
officially and fully recognized by the U.N. and other states 
by one name, and.recognized by Greece by another. 
C.  THE ENLARGEMENT STRATEGY:  A BALKAN "MARSHALL PLAN" 
In addition to a Hobbesian prescription that would 
impose political order in the region, a second step is 
essential to facilitate regional peace.  That is, the United 
States and its Western allies could deflect the domestic 
repercussions in Greece and FYROM caused by compromise with 
293Edmund Burke, "Speech on the Conciliation with 
America," (1775), The Works of Edmund Burke (Boston: Little, 
Brown, and Company, 1865), Vol II, p. 169, as quoted by Hans 
J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1978), p. 554. 
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a "carrot and stick" policy.  The United States and its 
Western allies might attempt to reward positive steps taken 
by the political elites of Greece and FYROM toward peaceful 
relations by arguing that Athens and Skopje deserve support 
from international and regional institutions.  An 
enlargement strategy based on a new type of "Marshall Plan" 
could be used to thwart the appeals of hyper-nationalism and 
irredentism in this region. 
Thus, a strategy of enlargement through international 
and regional institutions could be used to coordinate and 
direct political energies in benign directions.  Regional 
and international institutions would also be used to "fill 
the gap between booming political participation and a weak 
domestic.order threatened by the competing demands of 
illiberal organized interests."294  In short, a means of 
institutional accountability would be established that would 
provide incentives for cooperation and penalties for 
regressive behavior. 
This Balkan economic recovery program would form the 
second part in the overall strategy, just as the "Marshall 
Plan" provided an essential counterpart to the "Truman 
Doctrine." And instead of an economic aid program designed 
to promote democracy and prosperity and to thwart the Soviet 
294Jack Snyder, "Averting Anarchy," p. 131 
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Union, this enlargement strategy would aim at thwarting the 
rise of hyper-nationalism and irredentism, and would 
encourage Balkan market reforms, economic interdependence 
and recovery, and the linking of this reconstruction program 
with the European Union and the United States. 
According to Jack Snyder, "the Marshall Plan worked by 
creating international institutions to channel domestic 
interests in a direction favorable to international 
cooperation and stability."295 Practically speaking, this 
enlargement strategy would follow Stephen Van Evera's policy 
prescription (similiar to the Charter of Paris in 1990 and 
the "stability pact" approved by the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe in March 1995), which 
stipulates that Western economic relations with new Eastern' 
states should be conditioned on their compliance with six 
principles:  (1) rejecting the use of force in settling 
disputes; (2) guaranteeing the rights of national 
minorities; (3) refraining from chauvinist propaganda; (4) 
adopting a democratic form of government; (5) introducing 
free markets and economic reforms; and (6) recognizing 
current national borders.296 
295Ibid., p. 130. 
296Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism," pp. 36-37. 
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An enlargement strategy based on economic 
reconstruction and interdependence could counter the threat 
of hyper-nationalism and war, since one of Van Evera's 
hypotheses on nationalism and war says that "if economic 
conditions deteriorate, publics become more receptive to 
scapegoat myths, hence such myths are more widely believed, 
hence war is more likely."297 Non-observance or deviation 
from the approved principles of conduct would bar Balkan 
states from Western markets and would bring additional 
economic sanctions.  Thus, threatening to withdraw the 
"carrot" of the economic assistance, and security guarantees 
offered by the United States and major West European 
governments would form the basis for the "stick" policy.  In 
other words, this policy would apply international and 
regional economic penalties and military responses if cross- 
border military aggression or other acts of war occurred. 
It appears that the United States has already implicitly 
accepted such an obligation in the southern Balkans with a 
deployment of troops forming a "line in the sand" in FYROM. 
A regional organization or agency could be established 
to monitor compliance with the approved principles of 
conduct.  This agency could then dispense economic 
assistance on the basis of a formula for states that comply 
297Ibid., p. 9. 
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with the above criteria.  In addition to the compliance with 
the approved principles of conduct, voluntary decreases in 
military expenditures could also be rewarded with some form 
of economic assistance.  Within this agency, an inter-state 
payments mechanism could be established along the lines of 
the European Payments Union (EPU).  As Stanley Fischer 
suggests, a payments mechanism of this sort could facilitate 
transactions among the central banks of each state in the 
union; serve as a mechanism to extend credit and prevent 
balance of payment problems; and provide a central 
organization that could stimulate inter-state cooperation.298 
Consequently, this strategy of enlargement by the 
United States and its Western allies would restrain and 
channel Balkan hyper-nationalism and irredentism in benign 
directions.  This enlargement strategy based on economic 
development and the promotion of democracy in the Balkans 
would be consistent with America's national security 
strategy as well.  For the U.S. National Security Strategy 
says that: 
All of America's strategic interests...are served by 
enlarging the community of democratic and free market 
nations.  Thus, working with new democratic states to 
help preserve them as democracies committed to free 
markets and respect for human rights, is a key part of 
298Stanley Fischer, "Stabilzation and Economic Reform in 
Russia," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1992, p. 
105 
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our national security strategy.299 
The promotion of democracy is a cornerstone of U.S. 
foreign policy in most regions.  The argument for the 
promotion of democracy is not that democracies are less 
aggressive or not predisposed to hostility toward 
nondemocracies, but that democracies are not aggressive and 
hostile toward other democracies.300  Immanuel Kant offers 
insight into this theory: 
If the consent of the citizens is required in order to 
decide that war should be declared, nothing is more 
natural than that they would be very cautious in. 
commencing such a poor game...But, on the other hand, 
in a constitution which is not republican and under 
which the subjects are not citizens, a declaration of 
war is the easiest thing in the world to decide upon, 
because war does not require of the ruler, who is the 
proprietor and not a member of the state, the least 
sacrifice of the pleasure of his table, the chase, his 
country houses, his court functions, and the like.301 
Democratic principles do not change human nature, but 
act as a "leash of accountability" for political elites. 
Thus, assisting Balkan states in democratic reforms and 
299A National Security Strategy of Engagement and 
Enlargement, The White House, February 1995, p. 22. 
300Michael W. Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and 
Foreign Affairs," eds. Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis, 
International Politics (New York: HarperCollings Publishers, 
1992), p. 65. 
301Immanuel Kant, "Perpetual Peace," in The 
Enlightenment, ed. Peter Gay (New York: Simon & Shuster, 
1974), pp. 790-792, cited in Michael W. Doyle, "Kant, 
Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," eds. Robert J. Art 
and Robert Jervis, International Politics (New York: 
HarperCollings Publishers, 1992), p. 66. 
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institutions that do not centralize power may provide the 
accountability necessary for restraining hostility.  There 
is nonetheless always the risk that a rise in hyper- 
nationalist sentiment could undermine democratic principles 
and institutions; and these events could lead to war. 
But the risk of war is even greater when the effects of 
hyper-nationalism and irredentism are unrestrained in a 
centralized, undemocratic state.  On the other hand, long- 
term democratic stability would be endangered if emerging 
democracies adopted a form of majority tyranny and oppressed 
minorities.  To counter this tendency, Van Evera argues, 
multi-ethnic states such as FYROM should adopt 
consociational power-sharing rules along the Swiss model of 
democracy that would implement non-majoritarian 
principles.302 
D.  CONCLUSION 
Weiner's insightful model, written in 1971, predicted 
what might well happen when external forces, such as those 
engaged in the East-West power struggle during the Cold War, 
no longer dominated politics in the Balkans while local 
irredentist claims remained salient.  Only the determined 
leadership of a great power, such as the United States, 
302Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," p, 
35. 
167 
might be able to counter these forces by imposing a new set 
of principles of conduct. 
Such leadership, according to Inis L. Claude, must 
possess the "resolution and audacity to move out front, to 
pull the majority along rather than to wait for it, to carry 
the lion's share of the burden while tolerating free riders, 
and to live with the inevitable criticism."303 The United 
States has proven itself capable of such leadership in the 
past.  If it deems this situation in the southern Balkans 
important to its security interests, and its initial 
approach suggests that it does, then it is imperative that 
it find the political will to provide leadership regarding 
this explosive issue.  Otherwise, the current reactive U.S. 
foreign policy approach in the southern Balkans might always 
be a step or two behind.  That would be a dangerous way to 
conduct policy in this strategically important and volatile 
region. 
303Inis L. Claude, "Collective Security After the Cold 
War," Third Annual Strategy Conference, Strategic Studies 
Institute, February 1992, p. 18. 
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